

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

JANUARY, 1973

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# Current History

January, 1973

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*What are the prospects of a peace settlement in the Middle East? This issue examines the factors involved in the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute and the nations in the area most closely affected. As our introductory article points out: "Since 1970, it is plain, the paths of the peacemakers have indeed been rocky and tortuous and have led, if not to a dead-end, then to no more than the smallest tangible results."*

## Israel After Twenty-Five Years

BY DWIGHT JAMES SIMPSON

*Professor of International Relations, California State University*

IN MAY, 1973, the citizens of Israel will observe the twenty-fifth anniversary of their country's existence as an independent political state. The occasion will undoubtedly be marked by great joy and self-congratulation on the one hand, and sober stock-taking on the other. Certainly there is a great deal to which Israelis and their friends and supporters abroad can point with pride.

Since 1948, Israel has grown and prospered. As a result of three successful wars against adjacent Arab countries, and particularly as a result of the shattering Israeli victory in the Six Day June war of 1967, Israel now occupies and controls vast stretches of territory in the heart of the Middle East. This means that for the first time in her brief history Israel's defense lines are very strong, and her military capacities are fully able to defend the country against any foreseeable contingency. Indeed, Israel's military strength in 1973 is so formidable that the combined military strengths of the neighboring Arab states are inferior, qualitatively and quantitatively, to her own.

But as the expected twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations proceed, many thoughtful Israelis may ruefully acknowledge that all that glitters is not silver. Indeed, there is a remarkable sameness about the basic Israeli condition, in spite of the fact that many important changes have taken place. Today, as was the case 25 years ago, Israel's central problem is still the fundamental problem of national survival in the face of seemingly unending conflict with her Arab neighbors. Survival is the be all and end all of Israeli life, with the result that all other questions, no matter how important, are subordinated. The three

successful wars against the Arabs (1948-1949, 1956, and 1967) were victories for Israel but, paradoxically, wars were sadly inadequate as solutions to the country's basic problem of national survival. In this regard, Israel occupies a position diametrically opposed to that of her Arab neighbors, particularly Syria, Jordan and Egypt. These states have been repeatedly defeated by Israel. But their losses in war, even though the losses entailed great loss of territories, grave political turmoil and serious social and economic dislocation, never substantially impaired their capacities for national survival. In Israel's case, the condition is different. Were she to lose a prospective "fourth round" of the Arab-Israeli war, Israel's very existence as a political state would be seriously imperiled.

Obviously, therefore, Israel has an urgent need for peace with her Arab neighbors. At the beginning of 1973, to what extent is it realistic to expect that peace will prevail? If one takes literally the official pronouncements of the leaders of the disputing nations, the outlook is, unfortunately, extremely dim. A recitation of these pronouncements is a dismal litany, since it seems to underscore both the nearness of war between Arabs and Israelis and the ineffectiveness of the various diplomatic efforts undertaken over the past five years to prevent a renewed conflict.

First, examine the Arab position. At the end of 1971, Hasan al-Bakr, President of Iraq, stated that all efforts to reach a peaceful settlement with Israel should be abandoned, and a war of popular liberation of Palestine should be launched. Within a week, the Iraqi leader's statement was underscored by Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt. In an official statement

from Cairo, President Sadat declared, "There is no longer any hope whatsoever of peaceful settlement. Our decision is to fight." From Jordan's King Hussein, the theme was the same. In his annual speech from the throne in Amman in early 1972, King Hussein said that war with Israel was inevitable as long as Israel remained on Arab lands. Ten days later, King Hussein qualified his statement somewhat by noting that the Arabs were not prepared for war with Israel and that Jordan would not, in the King's words, "be dragged into war unless we are convinced of the reason and logic of the action."

President Hafiz Asad of Syria not only echoed the theme of inevitability of renewed warfare with Israel, but went further, calling for a firm union of all Palestine guerrilla forces in a combined guerrilla-Arab government effort against Israel. This marked the first time an Arab head of state had attempted to solidify the anti-Israeli coalition by including guerrilla forces. Although President Asad's efforts were inconclusive, he may have taken the first important step toward effective collaboration with the Palestinian guerrillas who heretofore had frequently been at bitter odds with established Arab governments.

The official Israeli response to the question of peace or war has been equally discouraging. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, upon her return to Israel from high-level talks in Washington in December, 1971, stated bluntly that Israel must act on the "assumption war will break out." This bleak outlook was reiterated by the Israeli Chief of Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev (subsequently appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Meir Cabinet) who stated flatly that the chances of peace in the Middle East were "slightly more than zero."

### **PATHS OF THE PEACEMAKERS**

Since 1970, it is plain, the paths of the peacemakers have indeed been rocky and tortuous and have led, if not to a dead-end, then to no more than the smallest tangible results. In June, 1970, United States Secretary of State William Rogers proclaimed the outlines of a new dimension of what had earlier come to be known as the Rogers Plan. The new guiding principle expressed by the secretary was "to encourage the parties (Arabs and Israelis) to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring" (the Swedish diplomat appointed by the United Nations to conduct discussions with the belligerents).<sup>1</sup> Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir quickly rejected the cease-fire proposal embodied in the Rogers initiative on the grounds that it would only encourage and permit Arab (prin-

cipally Egyptian) preparations for resuming full-scale hostilities against Israel. However, Israel was quickly outmaneuvered in world public opinion by Egypt's then President, the late Gamal Abdel Nasser, who announced on July 23, 1970, his country's provisional agreement to the Rogers proposals. King Hussein of Jordan gave his country's assent three days later. Syria, Iraq and the Palestine guerrilla organizations refused to agree, but the acceptance by Egypt and Jordan was very significant, placing Israel under great pressure to change her negative stance. Indeed, the pressure produced a major political crisis in Israel. The Meir Cabinet was based on a coalition which included the right-wing Gahal party under the leadership of the former terrorist Menachem Begin. Gahal's position was somewhat ambiguous in that it accepted the cease-fire provisions of the Rogers initiative but rejected any withdrawal from Israeli-occupied Arab territories, a point which was unstated but was clearly implicit in the United States proposal. By a vote of 117-112, reached after stormy debates in its central committee, the Gahal party refused to budge, and withdrew from the Meir coalition government. Menachem Begin's parting shot at the Meir Cabinet was that by agreeing to the Rogers proposals it had become "a government of national surrender to a Middle East Munich."<sup>2</sup>

Prime Minister Meir quickly reformed her government coalition, and on August 4, 1970, Israel officially announced her acceptance of the cease-fire. A cease-fire along the embattled Suez Canal was formally proclaimed three days later, and was followed immediately by charges on the part of Israel that Egypt was violating the agreements by re-deploying military units in the so-called "standstill" zone. No final proof of the Israeli charges was ever adduced, and the United States tended to minimize their importance. Many observers felt that the Israeli charges were made not because alleged Egyptian re-deployments had occurred (or were actually serious if they had occurred) but because the mere allegations were expected to be helpful in pressuring the United States to grant Israel more military equipment. The subsequent course of events tended to support this interpretation. Throughout the autumn of 1970, Israel and the United States engaged in a long series of discussions culminating with the Israeli announcement on December 28, 1970, of Israel's decision to resume peace talks with Egypt and Jordan through the offices of Ambassador Jarring. In a speech to the Knesset, Prime Minister Meir pointedly underscored the "clarifications" Israel had received from the United States, and she dwelt at some length on the American assurances of continuing military, economic and political support.

In February, 1971, Ambassador Jarring handed the Egyptian and Israeli representatives identical

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of State, Press Release No. 193, June 25, 1970, p. 3. The full text of the Rogers Plan appears in Department of State Publication 8507, January, 1970.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, August 1, 1970.



notes in which each country was requested to specify its position on the two points necessary for a final peaceful settlement—Egypt's entering into a formal peace agreement with Israel, and Israel's withdrawal from the Egyptian territory occupied since the 1967 war. The Egyptian response to Jarring on February 15, 1971, represented a major breakthrough in that it indicated a conditional willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. This was the first time an Egyptian government was on public record that it would accept a peace treaty with Israel, such an acceptance clearly implying that Egypt further accepted the permanent existence of Israel as a political state in the heart of the Middle East. Israel's response was negative, the key sentence being "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines."<sup>3</sup>

At a press conference on March 16, 1971, Secretary of State Rogers recognized the obvious when he stated "there is what seems to be an impasse." Rogers seemed assured that the impasse could be overcome, and stated that "we are going to see that it is overcome."<sup>4</sup> However, subsequent events did not in any way fulfill the Secretary's hopeful expectations. Throughout the rest of 1971 the belligerents continued a desultory "sparring through Jarring" with no concrete results.

Events had placed the United States in a very awkward position. The Egyptian response to the Jarring mission had been mainly favorable, and Egypt's announced willingness to enter into a formal peace agreement with Israel represented great progress. Consequently, no further United States attempts to mount diplomatic pressure on Egypt seemed warranted. Israel's intransigence on the question of occupied Arab territories was the real stumbling block. However, 1972 was an American presidential election year, and the Nixon administration, neither more nor less than other administrations since 1948, was aware of the serious domestic political risks involved in adopting a "tough" stance on Israel in the months before election day. Throughout 1972, therefore, President Richard Nixon prudently followed the path well traveled by his predecessors in office, temporizing with an intransigent Israel in order not to arouse the wrath of the large and powerful American Jewish voting bloc. Indeed, during the pre-convention, primary election period, all the candidates for President, from both major parties, vied with each other in proclaiming unwavering support for Israel. This competition reached such a pitch that *The New York Times* at

one point was prompted to remark that the American presidential candidates behaved as if they were "running for seats in the Knesset."

### A FURTHER ROUND IN 1973

By early 1973, with the American elections completed, the stage was set for a further round of diplomacy intended to bring the Palestine War to a final end. The outlook remains unpromising. The position of the United Nations is unchanged from that expressed in the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution of November, 1967. There the Security Council noted "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," and affirmed as a basic principle the necessity for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent conflict."<sup>5</sup>

In stark contrast, the present Israeli government has said on several occasions that it does not plan to return to the pre-1967 borders. Specifically, the Israelis have made clear their intentions to hold permanently the Syrian territory of the Golan Heights, the city of Jerusalem and the formerly Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, as well as significant parts of Jordan's western bank territory and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Not only does Israel intend to hold these large occupied Arab lands, she is taking many important steps to insure the permanence of her grip on them. These steps include the building of permanent settlements and fortifications in the Syrian Golan, the rather drastic alteration of the physical face of Jerusalem, the incorporation of occupied Jordanian territory into the Israeli economy, and the construction of permanent roads and settlements in the Egyptian Sinai. Given the extent and depth of these Israeli changes in the occupied Arab territories, it is obvious that any United Nations peace effort will be faced with what seems an insoluble problem. Unless the United Nations rescinds its Security Council Resolution of 1967 (highly unlikely), there is no reason to expect a United Nations initiative to be effective.

From the Arab perspective, the situation is equally unpromising. By agreeing that the post-1967 boundaries are permanent, the governments of Syria, Jordan and Egypt would be placed in the position of agreeing to the forcible detachment by Israel of vast stretches of their territories. The Arab governments, for obvious reasons, have neither the intention nor the authority to make such an agreement.

The one element of flexibility seems to remain with the United States. Safely reelected to a final four-year term, President Nixon once again has the politically acceptable option of exerting pressure on Israel. If the President chooses to try to induce Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories in exchange for a permanent peace settlement, there is at least the possibility of reaching a Palestinian settle-

<sup>3</sup> For the full text of the Israeli statement, see *The New York Times*, March 8, 1971.

<sup>4</sup> For the text of Secretary Roger's remarks, see *The New York Times*, March 17, 1971.

<sup>5</sup> U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 242 (1967). No. 22, 1967.

ment by diplomatic means. If, however, the United States remains inactive in this regard, and the United Nations, the Israelis and the Arabs hold to their positions, then the chances of another round of the endless Palestine War will be substantially increased.

Secretary of State William Rogers, in a television interview in November, 1972, gave what may prove to be a significant indication of future American efforts. He declared that "We are going to do what we can diplomatically to see if we can get negotiations started between Egypt and Israel, and very soon now we will be very active in discussions of that kind."<sup>6</sup> Rogers went on to say that the United States believed that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) requiring Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories should be fully implemented. Obviously, in the face of unyielding Israeli intransigence on the question of occupied Arab territories, any serious attempt by the United States to carry out Rogers' intentions will produce a profound crisis in United States-Israeli relations.

Throughout 1972, Israel was confronted with a new dimension of the Palestine War. Members of various Palestinian Arab guerrilla organizations directed terrorist actions against Israel itself or against Israeli citizens and property abroad. Bombings, airplane hijackings, destruction of property and assassinations became commonplace. Two of the most grisly incidents were the machine gunning of passengers in the waiting room of Tel Aviv's Lod Airport by Arab-hired Japanese terrorists, and the slaughter of 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team during the course of the summer games at Munich.

To these incidents and to other terrorist actions, the Israeli government response has been both quick and punishing. There have been extensive Israeli military forays, with both ground troops and air power, into adjacent Arab countries, principally Lebanon and Syria, who have been accused by Israel of harboring and sheltering terrorists. These massive search-and-destroy missions have been frequent and have produced very severe damage and great loss of life among Arab villagers. Nonetheless, they have been relatively ineffective in shutting off the terrorist activities. These continue to be widespread, and reached a sensational high point in November, 1972, when Palestinian guerrillas seized a Lufthansa jet, the captured passengers of which were used as hostages by the guerrillas to effect the release by the West German government of the three imprisoned Arab terrorists who had earlier participated in the Olympic Games massacre.

The West German government's release of the

three Palestinians involved in the Olympic Games tragedy momentarily stunned the Israelis. Prime Minister Meir publicly rebuked the German authorities, and simultaneously recalled the Israeli Ambassador to Bonn for consultations. The German explanation was that Germany could not countenance risking the lives of passengers on a German-flag aircraft; even more important, Germany did not want to get involved in incidents in which she had no national stake or interest. The Bonn government spokesman, Conrad Ahlers, stressed the fact that the "German government must set other measuring sticks for their behavior than the Israeli government can do" because Israel "is on a war footing with the Arab countries and the Federal Republic is neither a participant nor cause of this conflict."<sup>7</sup>

### THE ISRAELI ECONOMY

For reasons that need no underscoring, in 1973 Israel continues to allocate the great bulk of her national budget, her manpower and her administrative effort to the problems of national defense. Understandably, Israeli investments in non-defense areas have been held steady or even cut back. This has produced a heated public dialogue, the terms of which have indicated a growing war-weariness in Israel. Many significant elements of the Israeli labor force appear to yearn for more butter and fewer guns. This was especially apparent in the wave of strikes and work stoppages in 1972. During the 1967 War and the years immediately following, a kind of siege mentality developed in Israel. For these years, the battle cry was sacrifice. Wage earners were encouraged to forego increased personal consumption while wages were effectively frozen. Meanwhile, however, defense expenditures rose dramatically, helping to produce a serious inflationary situation. The Israeli pound was devalued by 20 per cent in mid-1971, while the retail price index rose during 1971 by 25 per cent. During the same period, hourly wages rose only by 12 to 15 per cent, precipitating an important decline in the average wage earner's living standards. By October, 1972, Gidon Ben-Israel, the Meir government's chief labor relations officer, declared: "We are faced with a spiralling situation that is out of control. The government has no choice but to crack down."<sup>8</sup>

Ben-Israel's suggestion of a crackdown would be extremely difficult to implement, however. Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir had earlier noted that "all the

*(Continued on page 36)*

<sup>6</sup> *The Jerusalem Post*, November 7, 1972.

<sup>7</sup> *The New York Times*, October 30, 1972.

<sup>8</sup> *The New York Times*, October 25, 1972.

Dwight James Simpson is Chairman of the Department of International Relations at California State University, San Francisco. A political scientist, he is a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs and has had long experience and residence in the area.

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*Noting that the Middle East crisis "continues to fester because the international community fails to admit that Palestinian nationalism is sufficiently viable to give a common sense of destiny to . . . 1.3 million refugees . . .," this specialist concludes that "Black September's operations have been remarkably successful in causing the world community to focus its attention on the plight of the Arab refugees, but they have failed to shatter the resolve of the Israeli people whose defense forces will undoubtedly continue their policy of armed retaliation. Therefore a solution to the plight of the Arab refugees is imperative unless the international community is willing to live with a cycle of terrorism and counter-terror."*

## Black September: Militant Palestinianism

BY JOHN B. WOLF

*Director, Center for Research on Problems of National Integration and Survival*

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN Israel and a dispersed population of Arab refugees is the crux of the current Middle East crisis. It continues to fester because the international community fails to admit that Palestinian nationalism is sufficiently viable to give a common sense of destiny to the 1.3 million refugees quartered in camps situated in Arab states adjacent to Israel. Another 400,000 Arabs, also, are part of the displaced Palestinian population. However, these 400,000 people, many of whom are cloistered in Jordanian cities, are the non-refugee population of Jordan's west bank; they were disturbed by the 1967 war but technically they are not considered refugees but are regarded as "displaced persons."

For almost 25 years this problem has defied solution: The Arabs insist that the absorption of the refugees into their states would imply their approval of Israel's continued retention of refugee property and would indicate their tacit recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. They assert, also, that the refugee problem is the responsibility of the great powers that helped create the Jewish state. Israel, however, insists that the plight of the Palestinians is a result of the wars

forced upon Israel by the Arab governments and that any adjustment in their status must form an integral part of a general and final peace settlement.<sup>1</sup>

Other obstacles to a permanent peace in the area must also be removed, particularly the obstacle constituted by Israel's continued retention of territory she occupied during the course of the 1967 war. However, these additional obstructions are not explosive issues requiring immediate attention nor are they apt of themselves to terminate the gradual movement toward a lessening of tension, under way since the summer of 1970 when Egypt and Jordan reacted favorably to a peace plan formulated by the United States. But a solution to the refugee problem must be obtained.

Palestinians regard the conduct of an armed struggle against Israel as their only alternative to life and death in the refugee camps; they are convinced that violence and terror against Israelis everywhere are their sole alternative to disfranchisement. Regardless of past and possible future setbacks, they are committed to the conduct of a protracted war in spite of its threat to the very fabric of civilization itself. This is the warning broadcast by the Black September Organization (believed to be a supersecret arm of the Palestinian umbrella guerrilla organization known as Fatah) which was responsible for the tragedy at Munich in September, 1972. This group strives to focus attention on the plight of the Arab refugees and to remind the international community that its spectacular acts of terrorism will continue without end until justice for the Palestinian community is obtained.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the Arab position see U. N. Security Council, Provisional Records, Documents S/PV-1336 of June 10, 1967, pp. 86-88 and S/PV-1335 of June 10, 1967, pp. 51-56. Israel's view is expressed in Security Council, Provisional Records of June 13, 1967, Documents S/PV-1338, pp. 111-115 and John B. Wolf, "The Arab Refugee Problem," *Current History*, December, 1967, pp. 352-358.

<sup>2</sup> An understanding of the intense commitment of Fatah to the idea of protracted war is obtained by reading *Political Armed Struggle*, The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fatah, Beirut, 1970, and *Revolution Until Victory*, The Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fatah, Beirut, 1970.

The failure of contemporary international relations to gauge the efficacy of Palestinian nationalism is understandable; even the Palestinians did not become aware of their latent ability to help themselves until after the Six Day War. That war demonstrated to them that Arab military forces were no match for the Israeli defense organizations, and that only they themselves were sufficiently motivated to continue the prosecution of an armed and protracted struggle to regain their homeland. Their recognition of this truth is the source of "Palestinianism," a national political movement with two objectives. The first objective of the movement is to achieve the full integration of the Arab Palestinian with his lost lands, and its second objective is to alter the political situation which has excluded him or negated his presence in the formulation of plans concerning his future.<sup>3</sup>

In pursuance of these objectives, a guerrilla movement was organized and given the motto "National Unity, National Mobilization and Liberation." On March 21, 1968, the movement became a force with which to be reckoned, as it moved to counter an Israeli armored column bent upon the destruction of a Fatah command post in the Jordanian village of Karameh. An account of the guerrillas who drove off the Israelis in this episode was embellished and translated into a commando victory, and attracted swarms of volunteers to the guerrilla organizations. About one year later, a Palestinian Armed Struggle Command was organized to coordinate the military activities of the various guerrilla groups. Fatah, organized in 1965, was selected by the command to serve as the central organization because it was the most extensive of the groups and was relatively free of elitism and ideology. Emphasizing organization, discipline, and individual competence, Fatah worked to promote unity, and it selected Amman, Jordan's capital city and located in the midst of a concentrated group of displaced Palestinians, as its command post. Amman was compared by the more leftist guerrilla elements to Hanoi, as they likened North Vietnam to Jordan, where they had assembled to await the liberation of "occupied Palestine."<sup>4</sup>

Most Palestinians, however, were never primarily interested in the establishment of their own government in Jordan, but were satisfied to use the country as a sanctuary for their commando teams and for training recruits. Furthermore, their revolutionary elite realized that they lacked the means to execute an operation against Israel similar, for example, to the Tet offensive launched by the NLF in South Vietnam in 1968. Their theater of operations—open desert—does not provide the cover and concealment

of a Southeast Asian jungle, and they were unable to build an infrastructure inside the Israeli cities. Furthermore, their infiltrator teams of ten men often left nine dead in the target area and consequently accomplished little but shock action.

### A MISCALCULATION

The major setback to the guerrillas, however, came as a result of miscalculations by the extreme leftist elements in their movement who refused to accept Jordanian sovereignty and were determined to "revolutionize" Jordan. About 30 months ago, George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), emerged as a significant world revolutionist after delivering a key address on revolutionary strategy to an assembled group in Pyongyang, North Korea. At about the same time, his PFLP hijacked three airliners—United States, British and Swiss—to a landing strip in the Jordanian desert. Passengers and flight crews, held captive for three days, were finally released, but the guerrillas destroyed the planes. These events attenuated the already tenuous situation created a few months earlier by the remarks of Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), who declared northern Jordan to be "liberated" and who launched the slogan "all power to the resistance."

Meanwhile, Jordan's King Hussein, strengthened by the diplomatic support accorded him by the Egyptian government, found himself in a favorable regional and international situation for the first time since the Arab defeat of June, 1967, because both Egypt and Jordan had accepted the terms of the United States Peace Plan for the Middle East while making no mention of Palestinian national existence. The King believed that the logic of the peace plan involved the curbing if not the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance movement. Consequently, the hijackings by the PFLP and comments such as Hawatmeh's acted as a catalyst in bringing on a test of strength between the Jordanian army and the guerrillas. In September, 1970, the King's royal troops cracked down on Palestinian resistance organizations in a struggle described as a campaign whose carnage exceeded the devastation unleashed by the Mongols when they seized Baghdad in the thirteenth century. Although the guerrillas fired the first shots (a bombardment of the Amman radio station) and thereby took the final agonizing decision out of the King's hands, he was ready to move, because he believed that they intended to take over Jordan "Vietcong style." Commenting, the King said that he "could understand Palestinian resistance but not Palestinian revolution." The suppression of the guerrilla movement in Jordan was responsible for the rise of the Black September organization, whose name

<sup>3</sup> Edward W. Said, "A Palestinian Voice," in *The Middle East Newsletter*, October–November, 1970, Vol. IV, No. 8, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> John B. Wolf, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement," in *Current History*, January, 1971, pp. 26–31.



is intended to symbolize the wrath of the Palestinian people.<sup>5</sup>

Defeated in Jordan, the Palestinians tried to take advantage of an understanding concluded in November, 1969, between themselves and the Lebanese government. This pact, known as the "Cairo Agreement," permitted the guerrillas to continue their activities in southern Lebanon on a restricted basis; in exchange, they agreed not to wear their uniforms or carry weapons in Lebanese towns and not to shell Israeli territory from within Lebanon. During the winter of 1970-1971, as guerrillas streamed out of Jordan, the Lebanese government conducted a propaganda campaign which convinced many of its citizens that the harboring of Palestinians served only to provoke armed Israeli retaliation. Popular support, vital for the conduct of guerrilla war, shifted to the government and Fatah, under pressure, closed its offices in the refugee camps situated in Lebanon. It continued, however, to maintain offices in Beirut for its political intelligence and information units, and maintained operating bases in southern Lebanon for approximately 5,000 guerrillas. In 1971 and 1972, these bases were used by guerrilla squads as staging centers for attacks directed against villages in northern Israel. However, surprise military retaliation by Israeli defense forces decimated the guerrilla organization before it was effectively reorganized. An Israeli raid conducted in May, 1971, for example, involved a 32-hour occupation of a portion of southern Lebanon by an Israeli armored column which searched and seized six Lebanese villages used by the guerrillas.<sup>6</sup> Another sustained attack, carried out 12 days after the Munich tragedy, also involved the use of tanks for an assault described as a "combing and purging operation" in "Fatahland." Actually, Lebanon has ceded effective sovereignty over the extreme southern portion of her territory to Israel, and therefore the likelihood that a formidable guerrilla movement will be organized in this region is remote; unless, of course, Israeli countermeasures are discontinued.

As the summer of 1971 ended, it was unlikely that the Palestinians would achieve their national ob-

jectives by continuing exclusively to wage a guerrilla war according to the Maoist primer. Politically, they had tried to escalate tensions to a point which would cause the United States or the Soviet Union to pressure Israel into a settlement. In this area, Palestinian strategy was an abysmal failure, as evidenced by the remarkable reduction in cold war tension apparent after President Richard Nixon's visit to Moscow and Peking and the withdrawal of Russian military personnel from Egypt during the summer of 1972. Its military objective, to bleed Israel during the course of a protracted struggle similar to the one being waged in Vietnam, has caused more suffering and death to Palestinians than to Israelis. Consequently, the Palestinians have reduced their emphasis on a Maoist-type struggle, but only after becoming painfully aware that desert terrain inhibits this sort of operation, especially when technology (principally helicopters and sophisticated computerized infrastructural networks) gives Israel's counter-insurgent forces a focus, speed and mobility which the guerrillas cannot match.

The revised Palestinian strategy of protracted war now has the Israeli people themselves for its target.

Their will to continue the struggle is to be broken by groups such as the Black Septemberists which, by employing the tactics of terror in an urban environment, hope to raise Israel's costs of maintaining the status quo and thereby to force concessions. Essentially, urban terrorist operations differ from guerrilla warfare in two ways. Operationally, they involve small numbers of men who come together only for the planning and execution of operations; organizationally, the urban fighter is often gainfully employed by an element of the target population rather than being a part of a mobile guerrilla band on a continuing basis. Concerning operations, terrorist groups also believe that the psychological impact of terror in each case lessens their opponent's ability to use force.<sup>7</sup> This basic point has not been overlooked by Israel, the only nation prepared to take on the terrorists at gunpoint. It explains the actions of Israeli soldiers who stormed a hijacked Belgian airliner at Tel Aviv airport in May, 1972, killing two terrorists, and Premier Golda Meir's message to the West German government in September, 1972, asking the Germans to "take action for the liberation of the Israeli hostages and to employ force to this end." Apparently, Israel tries to reverse the basic strategy of terror and use it against the terrorists themselves as evidenced by the clear message that a hostage is no protection for a terrorist.

#### ISRAEL WAGES WAR

Israel, furthermore, realizes that the target of terrorism is the Israeli people, who are the group to be propagandized, and not the victims of terror who are beyond the effect of propaganda if the act is success-

<sup>5</sup> Various articles pertaining to the September, 1970, crackdown on guerrilla activity in Jordan are contained in *The Middle East Newsletter*, October-November, 1970, Vol. IV, No. 8, pp. 4-14. One of these articles is a frank interview with King Hussein and another is the account of a discussion with Nayef Hawatmeh of the PFLP.

<sup>6</sup> John B. Wolf, "Shadow On Lebanon," in *Current History*, January, 1970, pp. 21-26.

<sup>7</sup> The influence of terrorists upon the waging of guerrilla war is discussed by George Grivas-Dighenes, in *Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle—a Politico-Military Study* (London: Longmans, 1964), p. 73. The nature of *Urban Insurgency* is outlined by Carlos Morighela in *For the Liberation of Brazil* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1971), p. 65 and p. 89. Also the book by Raymond M. Momboise, *Blueprint of Revolution—The Rebel, the Party, the Techniques of Revolt* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970) is informative.

ful. Israel also knows that terror produces results far in excess of the time and resources expended on it, for while "it kills individuals . . . it intimidates thousands,"<sup>8</sup> and that the Black September organization may be attuned to the directions of Leon Trotsky, the Russian revolutionary who advocated the unrestricted use of terror by elitist bands, and who placed little emphasis on a Maoist-style, broadly based national guerrilla movement. Refusing to be coerced, Israel is resolved to wage a continuous war against the terrorist groups on their own grounds and with their own tactics and against their accomplices whom she will not absolve from punishment. Premier Meir is not sympathetic to the Palestinians, and has been quoted as saying that "there was no such thing as a Palestinian state."

Israel is perhaps more familiar and better equipped than the Palestinians to employ the tactics of terror. Many of her people once served in the Irgun Zvai Leume, a clandestine terrorist group which used these tactics successfully against the British when Palestine was a British mandate. In July, 1946, retaliating against the British for their arrest of Jewish leaders, Irgun blew up a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which was being used as a British army headquarters. Ninety-one persons were killed and 45 were wounded.<sup>9</sup> Menahem Begin, a former Irgunist and now the leader of Israel's right-wing Herut party, has called for a total war against the guerrillas in the Middle East and elsewhere, by whatever means necessary, and has asked for the passage of a new law imposing a mandatory death sentence on terrorists who kill Israelis. There exists, also, the possibility that Israeli security agents, once engaged in a worldwide hunt for convicted Nazi war criminals, might be used to track the terrorists. Evidence of Israeli capability in this area was displayed in September, 1972, in Munich, where officials of Israel's security services, described as specialists in psychological warfare against the Arabs, broadcast a final and unsuccessful appeal to the guerrillas in Arabic to release their hostages. Israel's commitment to remain firm is also evidenced by an account which appeared in the Tel Aviv daily newspaper *Hatzofeh*. This paper contended that the Munich tragedy might have been avoided if West Germany had not "surrendered" in February, 1972, to the demands of terrorists who hijacked a Lufthansa 747 at Athens and diverted it to Aden. At the time, Bonn paid a \$5,000,000 cash ransom to Palestinian hijackers for which it gained the release of the jetliner and its 186 passengers.

Meanwhile, secrecy continues to shroud the operations of the Black September group. The first indication of its existence was its statement of July, 1971, saying that it would mount a scorched earth policy against the Jordanian regime of King Hussein. Then, in November, 1971, four of its members assassinated the Jordanian Premier, Wasfi Tal, on the steps of a Cairo hotel. The Premier was regarded by Palestinians as a pro-Western Arab interested in negotiating with Israel. Evidence of the movement's ability to conduct operations outside the Middle East appeared in early 1972 when it claimed responsibility for the murder of five Jordanians living in West Germany accused of spying for Israel, an attempt on the life of Jordan's ambassador to London, the sabotaging of a factory in West Germany that made electric generators for the Israeli Air Force, and the destruction of an oil refinery complex at Trieste, Italy, that processed oil for "pro-Zionist" interests.

Concerning organization, European and Israeli intelligence sources contend that Black September is an elite arm of Fatah's secret service, consisting of 400 to 600 members. Sources in the United States, however, peg the group's membership at about 100 to 200 young extremists who were formerly members of Fatah. The movement supposedly consists of four main operating units that are variously responsible for Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. A few Palestinian guerrilla leaders in Beirut insist that Black September is less an organization than a state of mind, because it has no flag, symbol or offices. Casting suspicion on this view, however, is the fact that these same leaders seem to know about Black September's ability to export terror, for they remark that this group "will hit anything anywhere if they believe the target is sensitive." Perhaps the actual identity of the group's members will not be established until each of them is killed or captured.

The quality of the Black September terrorists exceeds that of the average guerrilla group. Dedicated and willing to die if necessary, most of them were born in refugee camps and attended Middle Eastern or European universities. In Europe, the terrorists blend into a background composed of a large number of students from North Africa and other Arabs attracted by high wages paid for such jobs as building the new Brussels subway. Mohammed Mustafa Syein, a deputy of Fatah's chief, Yasir Arafat, was the movement's first leader. In July, 1971, he was killed

(Continued on page 37)

<sup>8</sup> Leon Trotsky, *The Defense of Terrorism—Terrorism and Communism, A Reply to Karl Kautsky* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935), p. 55.

<sup>9</sup> Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads To Israel* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1965), p. 245 and pp. 248-250. Also read p. 301 for an account of the King David Hotel incident.

John B. Wolf is a specialist in Middle East studies and has written a number of accounts of the role of national minorities in domestic and world politics. As a professor at the City and State Universities of New York, he taught courses in the history and politics of the Middle East and Africa.

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*"It is possible that, given the present deadlock of peace efforts in the Middle East, post-Nasser's Egypt may become progressively more closely identified with the political and military aims of the Palestinian National Movement."*

## Egypt and the Palestinians

BY YASSIN EL-AYOUTY

*Visiting Professor of African and Middle Eastern Studies,  
State University of New York at Stony Brook*

EMERGING FROM THE SHOCK of the sudden passing of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt found that she had lost two of her most important instruments of influence on the Palestinian National Movement (PLO-Fatah): the war of attrition against the Israeli occupation of Sinai, and the charisma of Nasser, who is still regarded by the Palestinians as "the departed Father." The decrease of Egypt's prestige among and influence on the Palestinians, as of late 1970, was compounded by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's non-fulfillment of various promises of direct action on the Suez front, particularly the "Year of Decision" which ended on January 1, 1972, without either peace or war.

Other factors which have contributed in the last two years to the Palestinians' lack of confidence in Egyptian leadership in the Middle East conflict include the active search by President Sadat for a political and peaceful settlement of the conflict; the Palestinian apprehension lest Egypt's attention may be solely focussed on a Suez agreement with Israel which would leave the Arabs east of Sinai alone to fend for themselves vis-à-vis Israel; the absence of a forceful Egyptian response to Israeli attacks against the Palestinian points of refuge and action in Lebanon and Syria; and the decrease in direct consultations between Egypt and the PLO-Fatah on matters of common concern, as evidenced by Sadat's proposal of September 28, 1972, regarding the advisability of setting up a Palestinian government-in-exile.

Yet, in spite of all these elements which have adversely affected the Egyptian relationship with the Palestinian National Movement in the course of 1971 and 1972, there are other positive factors which have kept the relationship at a fairly functional level. Egypt's commitment to the concept of the "Arab nation" has been constantly affirmed, and the change of the country's name from the U.A.R. to the Arab Republic of Egypt did not presage the emergence of an "Egyptian Egypt." More important, from the Pales-

tinian point of view, the Sadat initiative of February 4, 1971, regarding an interim Canal settlement was linked by Egypt inextricably to a comprehensive settlement of the conflict, including "the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland." Moreover, Egypt has consistently regarded the Palestinian resistance, meaning the PLO, to quote President Sadat's speech to the People's Assembly in Cairo on October 15, 1972, as "the legitimate and free [*Al-Sharie Al-Hurr*] representative of the Palestinian people."

Moreover, Egypt's insistence on Israel's full withdrawal from all territories occupied since June 5, 1967, and on the settlement of the Palestinian refugee question on the basis of all United Nations resolutions (including Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December, 1948, providing for repatriation and/or compensation) goes a long way towards meeting the PLO political program of 1968. That program, it will be recalled, calls for the establishment of a democratic, united and secular state of Palestine on the basis of one man-one vote.

The continuing viability of Egypt as a mediator not only between the Palestinians and Jordan (1971 and 1972), and the Palestinians and Lebanon (1972), but also within the Palestinian Movement itself, should also be considered a positive factor in Egyptian-Palestinian relationships. This mediatory role is still being performed by Egypt either single-handedly or jointly (with Saudi Arabia in 1971 and 1972 and with Libya) on the basis of the Nasser legacy of host-country agreements with the Palestinians concluded with Lebanon in 1969 and with Jordan in 1969 and 1970. Sadat's Egypt has therefore inherited a written framework for her mediations aiming at the preservation of the Palestinian resistance presence in the countries surrounding Israel.

Although Sadat's Egypt does not much differ from Nasser's Egypt in the area of concepts of the Palestinian resistance, it should be noted that only since

Nasser have the Palestinians and the Egyptians begun to make a conceptual inventory of their areas of agreement and disagreement. The process of stock-taking is not a deliberate one. However, it has become manifest as of early 1971 as a result of the articulation of the reasons for the Arab inability to force a military solution on Israel.

There is no doubt that Egypt, in her awareness of Palestinian apprehension of the possibilities for Egyptian isolationism in the post-Nasser period, began to reiterate her identification with "the cause of the Palestinian people." That "cause," from Egypt's announced point of view, was the "restoration of the rights of the Palestinians in their homeland." Egypt's identification with "the cause" is therefore much clearer as a policy concept and objective than her espousal of the PLO's political program for a "State of Palestine" covering all or Mandated Palestine.

With this in mind, Egypt's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 of November, 1967, could, but does not necessarily, imply a negation by Egypt of the PLO's "State of Palestine" program. This, in part, may explain the lack of direct Palestinian attacks on Egypt's acceptance of the said resolution, especially following the dramatic decline of Palestinian guerrilla fortunes in the area of conflict as of July, 1971. It should also be noted that no official statement has ever been issued by Cairo calling into question the viability of the PLO's "State of Palestine" program.

A second area of divergence in Egyptian-Palestinian policies is the utilization of armed force against Israel. The Palestinians were comforted by Egyptian declarations made repeatedly in 1972 to the effect that only by force could liberation be attained, following Egypt's failure to give effect to her deadline of "either war or peace in 1971." Examples of these declarations could be found in statements made by President Sadat, M. H. Haykal (Minister of National Guidance), Murad Ghaleb (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Mohammed Sadek (Minister of War) in the special session of the Arab Socialist Union held in February, 1972, to review Egyptian strategy following the student uprising of January-February, 1972. On that occasion, the leadership declared that there was no hope whatsoever of a peaceful settlement. The ASU Congress resolved, therefore, that the efforts for a political solution should be continued while Egypt continued to prepare for "the battle."

For the Palestinians, the latter part of the ASU resolve is the only segment with which they could identify as reflecting their motto "Revolution Until Victory." As for the "political" part of the Egyptian resolve, the PLO finds it impractical, a postponement of the inevitable confrontation, and a distasteful pursuit of an illogic search for accommodation with "the Israeli invaders."

A third area of divergence in the complex relationship is the outlook of Egypt on the nature and objective of Palestinian resistance. While Egypt and the Palestinian National Movement agree on the importance of Palestinian resistance in "the battle" with Israel, they differ with regard to its relation to governmental actions of pressure on Israel. The PLO, especially its radical wing as represented by the PFLP and the DPFLP, looks upon its campaign against Israel and the Israeli occupation as an identifiable element of Arab force independent of the Arab states. Egypt gives the impression of desiring to integrate the Palestinian resistance as part of the all-Arab pressure against Israel.

In addition, the elements of fragmentation of the Palestinian National Movement and the scattering of its resistance actions seem to trouble Egypt more than the leadership of the movement. Although the PLO has never ceased trying to unite its various organizations in a Vietcong-type of umbrella organization, allowing for neither dissolution nor integration of the various organizations (witness the effort of the PLO Executive Committee in Damascus in February, 1972), the division in the ranks is not regarded by the Palestinian leadership as negatively as Egypt regards it. For Egypt, the *wahda* (unity) of the Palestinian resistance movement is an essential corollary to its *tarkeez* (concentration) of struggle against Israel.

As for what Egypt regards as a "scatteration" of Palestinian effort, the issue here concerns both the lack of Palestinian activism inside the occupied territories (with the possible exception of Gaza), and the low level of Palestinian armed confrontation with Israel. In this connection, the Palestinians are usually defensive. They blame this scatteration largely on the "adverse role of the Arab regimes" in the conflict as reflected by the harassment of the Palestinian commando movement or the appeasement of the Israelis through inaction in the face of repeated Israeli military reprisals. Considering themselves in "a total state of war" against Israel, especially since the expulsion of the movement from Jordan in 1971, the Palestinians have defended every type of action directed by them against Israel, Israeli nationals or Israeli interests as "heroic" in certain instances, or as "the outcome of desperation," in other instances.

For Egypt, the only type of fedayeen action which could be considered as a real resistance effort is the armed struggle inside Israel and the occupied territories. This was expressed by various Egyptian spokesmen on several occasions even before the Munich affair of September, 1972 (see *al-Ahram* of August 9, 1972, on "Fedayeen Action," by A. H. Al-Gammal). Egypt is therefore both selective in what she regards as a true resistance effort on the part of the Palestinians and critical of what she regards as Palestinian organizational fragmentation and opera-



tional scatteration endangering the effectiveness of the "total Arab effort."

A fourth area of divergence in the Egyptian-Palestinian relationship is the search for an all-Arab effort to confront what is being considered by the Arabs as the Israel-United States axis. The two parties are in agreement with regard to the non-ideological nature of the Arab "battle" against Israel. Neither Egypt nor the PLO see in the Arab regimes either "rightist" or "radical" governments, but "supporters" or "non-supporters" of the all-Arab effort against Israel. For Egypt, this represents a shift from her stand on the ideological division in the Arab world leadership, which blocked open Egyptian cooperation with all shades of governmental orientations in the Arab world from 1958 to 1967.

As for the PLO of Arafat, the Fatah concept of "struggle, not ideology" has consistently prevailed. Thus Sadat could say on October 15, 1972, that "Egypt measures each Arab country by its relation and orientation to the Palestinian Resistance." This reflects an aspect of harmonious relationship between Egypt and the Palestinian National Movement. On the other hand, the Palestinians refer with anger and disappointment to the absence of any sustained Egyptian military effort on the Suez front. For this reason, they regard Nasser's war of attrition of 1969-1970 as having been of direct help to Palestinian resistance efforts. The calm on the Suez Canal front is considered by the PLO as indirectly helping Israel to wage her punitive actions against the Palestinians and their points of refuge and action. At the same time, the Palestinians regard the aims of any resumed Egyptian war effort across the canal with considerable suspicion. They feel that if Egypt were to renew her war of attrition, she will not be likely, if at all able, to broaden it into a full-scale war of liberation. A resumed armed Egyptian confrontation with Israel, so thinks the Palestinian National Movement, would only aim at forcing Israel to take a more reasonable stand in the negotiations within the framework of the Gunnar Jarring mission.

In assessing these and other areas of divergence between Sadat's Egypt and the Palestinians, it could be generally concluded that what binds the two parties together is stronger than what divides them. Here it should be noted that Egypt's insistence on the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the legitimacy of their struggle (as provided by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2787 (XXVI) of December 6, 1971) remains one of the strongest links between Egypt and the Palestinians.

### CRITICAL JUNCTURES

The mosaic of these working relationships between Sadat's Egypt and the Palestinians could be further analyzed in terms of some of the critical junctures

through which they passed as of late 1970. In this regard, it should be pointed out that the year 1971 was a year of emergence for Sadat's policy, while 1972 was a year of general assessment of that policy. In both years, the "no war—no peace" situation prevailed, and the efforts to find a diplomatic solution (whether under Jarring, under the Big Four, under the O.A.U., under Rumania or under Sadat's initiatives) came to naught. The impasse has resulted in considerable frustration and an atmosphere of gloom in Egypt. The critical junctures of Egyptian relationship with the Palestinians may be cited in terms of episodes in 1971 and 1972.

(1) The Sadat initiative regarding an interim solution for the Suez Canal in February, 1971, represented a low ebb in Egypt's relationship with the Palestinians. It was considered by them as a United States-induced device to freeze the line of conflict or an accommodation with Israel in Sinai on a permanent basis. This was countered by Egyptian assurances that "an interim solution must be a part of a comprehensive solution." In spite of these assurances, the Palestinians, having welcomed the Sadat declarations that the interim agreement plan was shelved, remain wary of its revival.

(2) Egypt responded positively to Ambassador Jarring, dated February 15, 1971, that she was ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel following Israel's total withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967, and a just settlement for the Palestinian refugee problem. The Palestinians looked upon the idea of a peace agreement as anathema to their political liberation program. They were, however, somewhat mollified by the suggestion that inter-state relationships in the Middle East would adequately reflect the result of their struggle for the application of the right to self-determination.

(3) The Egyptians offered no adequate responses to the final Jordanian push against the Palestinian commando movement in July, 1971; there was a total lack of Egyptian military response to Israel's attacks against Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians in these two countries, especially in the period beginning in February, 1972. These may be considered as the most embarrassing episodes in Egyptian-Palestinian relationships in 1971-1972, particularly after the Egyptian-Libyan-Syrian declaration of September, 1972, that an attack on one of these federated states would constitute an attack on all of them. Egypt's resort to blaming her military inaction on United States support of Israel and other international factors could not allay Palestinian fears that Egypt might have completely ruled out war as an instrument of national policy against Israel.

(4) The inability of Egypt to secure offensive weapons from the U.S.S.R. (MIG 23, SAM VI, armored personnel carriers to ford the Suez Canal)

which eventuated in Egypt's expulsion of Soviet military advisers in July, 1972, was regarded by the PLO as an understandable but inexcusable element of Egyptian military inaction against Israel and Israeli occupation. In addition, Egypt's expulsion of the Soviet military advisers in July, 1972, has remained a main source of puzzlement for the Palestinians.

(5) The policy of deadlines and justificatory statements for lack of action in connection with these deadlines, which has prevailed in Sadat's Egypt, remains a constant source of irritation to the Palestinians. Examples of such practice of "policy by deadlines" in Sadat's Egypt could be found in two major statements. The first was Sadat's speech on July 23, 1971, the first anniversary of the 1952 Revolution to find him President of Egypt. On that occasion, as was mentioned earlier, he promised "either war or peace in 1971." This was followed by heightened diplomatic activity on the part of Egypt, particularly concentrated on the United States. But little else followed. In fact, 1971 ended as Israel, through Israeli Premier Golda Meir's visit to Washington, D.C., in December of that year, succeeded in securing from the Nixon administration pledges of more Phantom fighter-bomber aircraft and more Israeli-United States policy coordination. So at the beginning of 1972, the Egyptian President had to offer an explanation for inaction. In his explanation on January 13, 1972, he blamed that inaction on the Indian-Pakistani war, and cited examples of Nasser's inaction in the face of a specific instance of Israeli military threat. This was not convincing and was derisively dubbed "the fog speech" (since Nasser's inaction in the instance cited by Sadat was blamed on fog in the Suez area). The second example, much less publicized than the so-called "fog speech," could be found in Sadat's speech on April 26, 1972, in the Hussein Mosque in Cairo. Commemorating the Birth of the Prophet (Maulid Al-Nabi), President Sadat promised once again that by Maulid Al-Nabi in 1973, "the consequences of Israeli aggression" would have been liquidated. The deadline has not yet arrived, and thus it is difficult to foretell whether it will also pass without either a peaceful or a forceful change of the status quo.

In any case, this practice of announced deadlines is far from instilling in the Palestinians a sense of confidence in Egypt's will to fight Israel even for the attainment of Egyptian political objectives which are more limited in scope than the PLO program.

These junctures in Egyptian-Palestinian relationships represent the delicateness of interaction between a "government" and a "revolution." The "government" (Egypt) wants the "revolution" (the Palestinians) to behave as a government, while the Palestinians expect Egypt to behave as a revolution. The mutuality of interests and the divergence of ap-

proaches obviously continue to characterize the interaction between these two most important Arab parties in the Middle East conflict.

As to the future of these relationships, it may be realistically considered from the angle of the programs announced by both Arabs and Israelis.

A. The Hussein plan of March 15, 1972, for a United Arab Kingdom made up of a Jordanian Province (east of Jordan) and a Palestinian Province (West Bank and possibly other areas, such as Gaza) was rejected by both the PLO and Egypt. It was considered as collusion with the Zionists and a denial of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and sovereignty.

B. The Allon and Dayan plans for "a Palestinian entity" made up largely of a demilitarized West Bank squeezed between Jordan and Israel have been equally rejected by the Palestinians. Their rejection of a truncated Palestine with no sovereignty and without Jerusalem as a capital has received Egyptian support.

C. The Sadat proposal of September, 1972, for a Palestinian government-in-exile was politely set aside by the PLO in its October, 1972, meetings in Damascus. However, the Palestinians were quick to note that in making the proposal, Sadat "did not impose his will on us. He did not deny us our right to accept or reject" (Baghdad, *Voice of Palestine*, 3 October, 1972).

In their relationship with Sadat's Egypt, the Palestinians appear to be certain that Egyptian efforts at a political settlement with Israel on the basis of Resolution 242 will ultimately fail as a result of Israel's negative response to Jarring's efforts. Their prediction, based on the concept of "Israel as a threat to the entire Middle East," is that the "no-war no-peace" situation will eventually force Egypt to war. In this connection, one should note that the principle of "no inch of territory to be surrendered" which is the Egyptian policy platform for "the liquidation of the consequences of aggression" is a possible reflection of Israeli statements regarding "the future map of Israel."

As examples of these statements which confirm the Palestinian prediction of war, one may cite Moshe Dayan's statement of October 4, 1972, in Tel Aviv: "No settlement would be stronger than the reality that has been created in the past 5 years." Another Israeli statement in the same vein was recently made by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, as reported on September 28, 1971, by *The Jerusalem Post*:

There are areas on the cease-fire lines that must be settled

(Continued on page 39)

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Yassin El-Ayouty is also an adjunct professor of African and Middle Eastern Studies at St. John's University.

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*"By removing the Soviet advisers, President Sadat . . . responded to a variety of pressures and inducements in addition to his own thoughts and emotions. Although Egypt was weakened militarily as an immediate result, she regained greater freedom of action in her foreign policy."*

## Egypt and the Soviet Exodus

BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

*Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley*

**D**URING THE FIFTEEN YEARS beginning with the mid-1950's, the Soviet Union made substantial advances in the Middle East in the political, military, economic and cultural sectors. Egypt occupied the central position in this policy of penetration. It is here that Moscow poured most of its economic and technical assistance. And it is here that the Soviet Union established a military presence exceeding that in any other country outside East Europe. Soviet military advisers, experts, instructors and combat personnel (primarily pilots and crews manning the SAM missile sites) were estimated to number upward of 15,000 men. The Soviet Union enjoyed the facilities of the Egyptian harbors for its 55-ship strong Mediterranean Fleet while Egyptian air bases along the coast served as virtual aircraft carriers for Soviet airplanes overflying and watching the units of the United States Sixth Fleet.

It was, therefore, with a surprise bordering on shock that the world learned, on July 18, 1972, of the Egyptian decision to expel Soviet military advisers. On that day Egypt's President, Anwar Sadat, informed the 230-man Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)—Egypt's sole political organization—that, on July 7, he had decided to terminate the services of the Soviet advisers as of July 17. On July 13 and 14, Egyptian Premier Aziz Sidky visited Moscow to bring the decision directly to the top Soviet leadership. And on July 24, Sadat confirmed his move in a major address given to the 1,500-man Congress of ASU. In these speeches, Egypt's President advanced two principal reasons for his decision: (a) his disappointment with the type of weapons and the pace of arms deliveries by the Soviet Union to Egypt; (b) his disappointment with the outcome of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in Moscow in May, insofar as the Middle East was concerned.

The two reasons publicly advanced by President Sadat were indeed the prime and immediate factors leading to the decision of expulsion. The subject of

arms was the principal item on the agenda of all four visits he had paid to the Soviet Union since his advent to power. These took place in March and October, 1971, and in February and April, 1972. During those talks a certain pattern had developed: on the issue of the timetable for deliveries, the Soviets made promises which they consistently violated; and on the subject of offensive weapons, they invariably sought excuses not to supply them. At stake especially was the MIG-23 fighter-bomber jet, the only aircraft in the Soviet arsenal approximating in quality the American Phantom plane (90 of which had been supplied to Israel by the United States between 1970 and 1972).

In his speech to the ASU Central Committee on July 18, Sadat revealed that in April he had put forth three demands to the Soviets: (a) that there should be no limitations in the supply of arms to Egypt; (b) that he could no more tolerate the state of "no peace-no war" which was slowly draining Egypt's energies; and (c) that Egypt would not accept any settlement based on territorial concessions to Israel. On July 24, speaking to the ASU Congress, Sadat added that there was a substantial difference in priorities between Egypt and the Soviet Union: while the liberation of Arab lands from Israeli occupation had first priority for Egypt, it occupied merely the third, fourth, or fifth place in Soviet thinking. Moreover, he stressed a difference in ideology: while the Soviet leadership was Marxist, he rejected Marxism.

The most candid revelation of the cluster of differences between Sadat and the Soviet leaders was made by Sadat in an informal talk to a group of Egyptian editors, subsequently reported in an American magazine. In this talk, Sadat revealed that on June 1, he had submitted to the Russians a 7-point questionnaire aiming at the clarification of their stand on arms and related issues. This questionnaire was disregarded by them: instead, on July 7, the Soviet Ambassador brought him the Soviet reply which,

after some bland reassurances of Soviet friendship, concentrated on accusing the Egyptian press for its campaign against the U.S.S.R. All of this occurred in an atmosphere of suspicion: "They never trusted me," Sadat was reported to have told the editors.<sup>1</sup>

The climate of mutual distrust between Sadat and the Russians had prevailed almost from the time of his advent to power in the fall of 1970. It was marked by several crises and aggravations. The first of these, in May, 1971, was the removal from the vice presidency of Ali Sabry, a man favoring close ties with Moscow. His dismissal was followed within days by a discovery of a plot masterminded by the Minister of Interior (and security head), Shaarawi Gomaa, in which Sabry was implicated. Moreover, in the very midst of this crisis—between Sabry's dismissal and the arrest of the plotters—Sadat received William P. Rogers, the first American Secretary of State to visit Egypt since United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' trip in 1953. In Moscow's eyes, Egypt was on the verge of a substantial reorientation of her policy. The Soviet response to these developments was to send to Cairo President Nikolai Podgorny who, on May 26, obtained Sadat's signature on a treaty of friendship.

Although in subsequent statements Sadat overtly defended his decision to sign a treaty—thus repudiating the long-standing Egyptian policy of "no foreign pacts"—in reality he was shocked and annoyed by the Soviet insistence on it and by the surprise manner in which it was proposed.

Soviet relations with the Egyptian President suffered a further decline when, in mid-July, 1971, the Communist party tried to overthrow President Jaafar Numeiri in the Sudan. The coup occurred within a few weeks after the formation of the Federation of Arab Republics (April 29) grouping Egypt, Libya and Syria. Both Colonel Muammer Qadhafi, head of Libya, and President Sadat contributed to the downfall of the short-lived Communist government in Khartoum and the restoration of General Numeiri: Qadhafi by capturing two Sudanese Communist leaders en route from London to Sudan, and Sadat by airlifting the loyal Sudanese troops from the Suez Canal front to rescue the beleaguered Numeiri.

The alacrity with which Moscow came to the assistance of India in her short-lived war with Pakistan in December, 1971, appeared, in Sadat's eyes, to have occurred at the expense of Egypt, both because the Soviets gave a higher priority to the conflict on the Indian subcontinent than to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and because their arming of Egypt was neglected in

the process. This disappointment was particularly grievous to Sadat because he had publicly committed himself to make the year 1971 a year of decision in liberating the Israeli-occupied lands.

The spring of 1972 brought no relief. Increased Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel further aggravated the state of mutual unhappiness. The final setback came in the wake of United States President Richard Nixon's visit to Moscow in May, 1972. Sadat—along with many Arabs—resented the fact that: (a) the Soviet Union did nothing concrete to promote the Arab cause during the conference; (b) by agreeing to arms limitations with the United States, it implicitly accepted a stalemate in the Middle East; (c) Soviet leaders neither consulted him before the meeting nor gave him any relevant information after it.

While thus the substance of Soviet-Egyptian relations gave ample cause to Sadat for revising his attitudes toward Moscow, a number of domestic pressures added another weighty factor to his decision.

It should be pointed out that Sadat was not alone in his feelings of disappointment with the Soviet performance. Early in 1972, soon after Sadat's self-imposed deadline for the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict expired without any tangible results, frustrated students in Cairo demonstrated and chanted anti-Soviet slogans. This, in turn, reflected the general Egyptian dislike of the massive Soviet presence. In fact, Cairo abounded in sarcastic stories about the haggling of Russians over food prices and the greedy buying in the bazaars of items that could later be easily smuggled into the Soviet black market.

In due course, these feelings and resentments found their way into the institutional channels. At the ASU Congress in February, 1972, pointed questions were asked about the Soviet military presence in Egypt and, more specifically, about the actual or presumed existence of Soviet bases. On April 4, 10 prominent Egyptians who had been closely associated with the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser addressed a note to President Sadat criticizing Egypt's "exaggerated dependence on the U.S.S.R."<sup>2</sup> The group was headed by two former Vice-Presidents, Abdel Latif Boghdadi and Kamaledin Hussein.

Equally serious were the articles critical of the Soviet position which were published in the spring and early summer by two leading editors in Egypt: Mohammed Hassanein Haikal of *Al-Ahram* and Ihsan Abdel Kuddous of *Akhbar al-Yom*. In his most militant article, on June 16, Haikal called for an end of the state of "no peace-no war" which, he claimed, was benefiting the Soviet Union but not Egypt, and asserted that the Arab-Israeli cease-fire must end soon or the Egyptian government would be undermined. And on July 14, Haikal urged the Arab leaders to take the Middle East conflict "into their own hands."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Newsweek*, August 7, 1972, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Al-Hayat* (Beirut), May 18, 1972, and *An-Nahar* (Beirut), July 13, 1972.

<sup>3</sup> *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 9, 16, 30; July 14, 1972.



Similarly critical voices were heard at a seminar on international affairs organized by *Al-Ahram*. In May, two high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials, Ismail Fahmi and Tahsin Bashir, voiced their disapproval of Soviet policies at the seminar. Bashir, head of the Press Department, asserted that at the forthcoming summit conference in Moscow, the American aim would be

to freeze the arms supplies which the Soviets have been giving to Egypt. . . . This does not mean a total embargo on arms to Egypt, but rather an attempt to maintain the present balance of strike power between Egypt and Israel. After that they [the Soviets] would give us statements of political support and assurances of liberation.<sup>4</sup>

Last, but not least, and perhaps decisive among the domestic influences was the attitude of the army high command. Many senior Egyptian officers resented the Soviet presence in their military establishment. There was an obvious difference in temperament and manners between the two national groups, the Russians holding a somewhat reserved opinion of Egyptian military prowess.<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, even top Egyptian command officers were denied access to certain Soviet installations and the ubiquitous Soviet presence proved embarrassing whenever Sadat wanted to address a military unit. It is understood that General Ahmed Sadek, the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense, together with the Army Chief of Staff, General Saadeddin Shazli, put strong pressure on the President to expel the Russians.

In reviewing these various factors leading to Sadat's decision, certain developments of international nature should also be mentioned. In mid-June, Prince Sultan

ben Abdul Aziz, Defense Minister of Saudi Arabia, arrived in Washington for a 13-day visit which brought him into contact with the highest echelons of the American government. According to the press reports, in the course of his conversation with President Nixon, the Prince brought up the subject of renewed American intervention to help solve the Middle East crisis, expressing the hope that the President would follow the noble principles of policy formerly established by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.<sup>6</sup>

President Nixon was reported as replying that the matter was "out of his hands" primarily because of the Soviet presence in Egypt, thereby implying that the removal of this presence might clear the path to a fruitful American policy in resolving the conflict.<sup>7</sup> The President's views were promptly communicated to King Faisal and, on his instructions, to President Sadat. Moreover, they were reported to have been discussed at a meeting held in late June by the three Presidents of the states of the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR), Sadat, Qadhafi, and Assad. Of the three, Colonel Qadhafi could be certainly counted upon as a strong anti-Communist who was on record as having publicly castigated Soviet imperialism, and who would understand Egypt's desire to free herself from undue dependence on Moscow. Moreover, Qadhafi, a leader of the oil-rich country with impressive revenue surpluses, was known for his advocacy of Arab self-sufficiency, militarily and industrially, and for his readiness to finance Egypt's endeavors linked with the liberation of Arab lands ever since the Arab summit meeting at Khartoum in 1967.

Inherent in these international diplomatic developments was the belief in many Arab quarters—including Egypt—that, ultimately, it was the United States rather than Russia which held the key to an acceptable Middle East settlement. This belief had earlier led Egypt to accept and to uphold the cease-fire initially proposed by United States Secretary of State William Rogers in 1970, to receive him in Cairo—despite the rupture of diplomatic relations, and to explore ways of implementing the United Nations Resolution 242 of November, 1967, which called for a settlement based on Israeli withdrawal. President Sadat implicitly confirmed this belief by saying that the removal of the Soviets had deprived Israel of the pretext to present her case in the West as an adversary of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.<sup>8</sup>

## SOVIET REACTIONS

The reactions germane to this analysis were those of the Soviet Union, the Arab world, and the United States.

The basic Soviet reaction was that of acceptance and restraint. The Soviets were prompt to implement the expulsion order, and the withdrawal was completed within some three weeks. Sadat's initial order

<sup>4</sup> Transcript of the discussion in *Al-Ahram*, May 19, 1972. Both Fahmi and Bashir were suspended from their jobs for making and publicizing these statements. Later, when President Sadat took a similar and even stronger position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, both were given new high appointments: Fahmi as Ambassador to Bonn, and Bashir in the Secretariat of the Arab League.

<sup>5</sup> A widely circulated story was that the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, flew into rage and physically assaulted an Egyptian fighter pilot whom he found sleeping in the late morning at an advanced air base while on an inspection tour. Although the authenticity of the story cannot be fully verified, the fact that it circulated testified to the friction existing between the Egyptians and their Russian mentors.

<sup>6</sup> President Eisenhower, it will be recalled, intervened in favor of Egypt during the Suez War of 1956 and exerted pressure on Israel to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza.

<sup>7</sup> *The New York Times*, July 24, 1972.

<sup>8</sup> "When I realized that the battle was inevitable and that the Americans and Russians reached a non-confrontation agreement at the Moscow meeting, I decided to liquidate the Russian military presence, because the presence of a single Russian soldier on the land of Egypt when my battle with Israel begins, constitutes a great service to Israeli strategy. Israel would claim that it is fighting the Russians, and not the Arabs, and thus win American and even European, public opinion. The meaning of this is that the Russians had become a burden on us. They do not fight and yet they give our enemy a means of blackmail to cover up what he is getting from the United States." From Sadat's interview with *Al-Hawadith* (Beirut), October 5, 1972.

exempted specifically the naval facilities enjoyed by the Soviet fleet, as well as the instructors engaged in the training of Egyptian troops. In spite of these exceptions, some 15,000 Russians were affected by the expulsion order.

Official Soviet media took a markedly restrained attitude. The *Tass* communiqué of July 15 said:

After an exchange of views, the sides decided it expedient to bring back to the Soviet Union the military personnel that had been sent to Egypt for a limited period. This personnel will shortly return to the U.S.S.R.<sup>9</sup>

In subsequent public statements Soviet leaders tended to avoid the subject and in no case engaged in re-primination with Sadat. Indirectly, however, criticisms were voiced. But this task of criticizing was carried by certain Arab Communist groups or by the Soviet press which referred to Sadat's decision in an oblique way. The strongest hostile reaction came from the Lebanese Communist party, whose daily organ noted that Sadat's move had followed the recent visit to the Persian Gulf area of Secretary Rogers and Yemen's resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States.

It is within this framework that Sadat has announced his serious decision which constitutes a serious retreat in the face of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary offensive and a serious switch in the direction of submitting to the United States and its defeatist terms.

The decision, said the paper, was "a hostile act against the Soviet Union."<sup>10</sup>

As for the Soviet press, *Pravda* of July 23, while playing down the withdrawal of Soviet advisers, observed:

One cannot ignore the fact, however, that in several Arab countries, Egypt included, right-wing reactionary forces opposed to social change are struggling to become more active. These forces are trying to sabotage progressive reforms and simultaneously undermine Soviet-Arab friendship.

This theme was reiterated a number of times both in the Soviet press and in the Communist or pro-Soviet papers in the Arab world.<sup>11</sup> Sometimes these articles carried a strong denunciation of certain Egyptian writers known for their coolness toward the Soviets<sup>12</sup> or a warning that the hopes of certain Arab leaders for a mutual understanding with the United States on the Middle East conflict were "illusory."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *The New York Times*, July 20, 1972.

<sup>10</sup> *Al-Nida* (Beirut), July 19, 1972.

<sup>11</sup> *New Times* (Moscow), August 19, 1972; *Al-Nida*, August 20, 1972.

<sup>12</sup> Thus *Izvestia*, August 28, 1972, in an attack on I. A. Kuddous of *Akhbar al-Yom*. Also *Al-Nida*, August 20, 1972.

<sup>13</sup> *Pravda*, August 23, 1972, almost identically *Al-Nida*, August 24, 1972.

<sup>14</sup> *Al-Ahram*, August 11, 1972.

<sup>15</sup> *Al-Ahram*, August 18, 1972.

Beyond these reactions loomed three larger questions: Would Russia continue her arms supplies and economic aid to Egypt? Would her setback in Egypt produce a chain reaction of similar adversities in the area as a whole? Would she translate her distrust of Sadat into an action aiming at his overthrow and replacement by a man she could trust? It is probably too early to give definitive answers to these questions. By the end of 1972, tentative answers began to emerge with regard to the first and second questions.

These were: first, trying overtly to minimize the conflict, Russia continued her arms and economic aid to Egypt, although precise details of the scope and quality of that assistance have not yet become known; secondly, there was as yet no sign of a chain reaction. On the contrary, it looked as if Moscow made special efforts to recoup her losses sustained in Egypt by gains in Iraq and Syria.

Following the conclusion of the treaty of friendship with Iraq in April, 1972, the Soviet Union stepped up its involvement in the development and arming of that country. The same was true of Soviet relations with Syria, which, though not based on a treaty, became closer following the July and September visits of President Assad in Moscow and the Soviet pledge of \$700 million worth of arms deliveries. As for the action aiming at the removal of Sadat, no evidence of any Soviet initiative was available. It is certain, however, that supporters of Sadat in Egypt and other Arab countries were often speculating about possible Soviet "revenge" against a man who singlehandedly shook up the edifice of Soviet-Egyptian friendship built and sustained by Nasser.

## ARAB REACTIONS

In Egypt, Sadat's decision gained him considerable popularity. He was especially praised and defended by Ihsan Abdel Kuddous in *Akhbar al-Yom*. Similarly positive was Mohammed Haikal in *Al-Ahram*, but while praising the ouster decision as the necessary "objective pause" between the friends, he urged continued Soviet-Egyptian friendship to which there was "no alternative."<sup>14</sup> This urging did not prevent him from an occasional outburst of criticism of Soviet policies toward Egypt.<sup>15</sup>

(Continued on page 35)

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George Lenczowski specializes in Middle Eastern and Soviet studies. He is the author of *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), *Oil and State in the Middle East* (Cornell University Press, 1960), *Soviet Advances in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971), *United States Interests in the Middle East* (American Enterprise Institute, 1968) and *The Political Awakening in the Middle East* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

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*"... like their 'imperialist' predecessors, the Soviets will some day have to come to grips with the fact that the volatility and hence 'unpredictability' of their Arab clients is no foundation on which to build long-range policy."*

## The Soviet Setback in the Middle East

BY OLES M. SMOLANSKY

*Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University*

ON JULY 18, 1962, President Anwar Sadat ordered the bulk of Soviet military personnel out of Egypt. (Estimates of the size of the force have ranged from 15,000 to 20,000 men.) His action appeared to have caught both the U.S.S.R. and the Western powers by surprise, and constituted a major setback to the Soviet Union's Middle Eastern policy. The six months which have subsequently elapsed are too short a period to perceive fully all the implications of Sadat's edict. Nevertheless, as 1972 draws to a close, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding both the extent and consequence of this Soviet reverse.

The decision to establish a Soviet presence in the Middle East was taken by the Kremlin in the mid-1950's. While states like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, situated along the southern borders of the U.S.S.R., rejected Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's offers to "normalize relations," some Arab countries, especially Egypt and Syria, showed an interest in establishing closer ties with Moscow. It should be noted that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to move closer to the Soviet Union was motivated by both his fear of Israel and his inability to secure adequate Western support for his military, political and economic aspirations. Khrushchev was no doubt aware that Nasser's prime motive for drawing the U.S.S.R. into Middle Eastern politics was to establish the Kremlin as a counterweight to the Western powers and then, hopefully, to play the two sides against one another. Khrushchev went along because Nasser's stand enabled the Soviets to establish themselves in the most populous Arab state which, moreover, occupied an important strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean and controlled the Suez Canal. In short, the new Moscow-Cairo relationship was a marriage of convenience based on a mutual desire to undermine Western influence in the Middle East.

However, this unity of short-term interests was not synonymous with a harmony of long-range interests for, whereas the U.S.S.R. was seeking to replace Western influence with its own, Egypt, which had just regained her independence after 72 years of British occupation, had no intention of being controlled by either West or East. In any event, the Kremlin scored its initial success with the conclusion of the 1955 arms deal and, in the ensuing years, established reasonably close relations with several other Arab states, most notably Syria and post-revolutionary Iraq. Nevertheless, throughout most of this period, Egypt remained the kingpin of the Soviet position in the Middle East, and Moscow has been fairly consistent in its efforts to maintain close relations with both Nasser and Sadat.

On the political level, Russia has unfailingly backed the Egyptians in their feud with Israel and, with a few exceptions, in their frequent squabbles with other Arab countries. Economically, the U.S.S.R. has assisted Cairo in the construction of the Aswan High Dam. The Kremlin has also provided substantial economic, financial and technical aid to help expand Egypt's industrial base. On the military level, Moscow has equipped the Egyptian armed forces with some of the most modern weapons and has trained Egyptian military in their use. It should be noted that this support continued in spite of the major defeats suffered by Cairo in the 1956 and 1967 wars with Israel. As a matter of fact, when large quantities of Soviet equipment were destroyed or captured by the Israelis, the U.S.S.R. invariably increased its deliveries with the result that, two or three years after these major setbacks, Egypt possessed an arsenal which, both quantitatively and qualitatively, was superior to that earlier demolished by Israel. It is also noteworthy that Soviet military support of Cairo has been relatively unaffected by the episodes of political strain

which have occasionally marred relations between the two countries.

A new phase of Soviet-Egyptian relations opened in 1970, when Israel, frustrated by her losses in the war of attrition along the Suez Canal and her failure to get Nasser to agree to peace talks, undertook deep penetration raids of Egyptian territory. In so doing, Jerusalem exposed Nasser's inability to protect the country's hinterland and population from assaults by the Israeli air force. In this grave crisis, the U.S.S.R. once again came to Nasser's assistance by stationing in Egypt Soviet air force units and the latest anti-aircraft missiles, manned and maintained exclusively by Soviet personnel. Their presence was intended to discourage Israel from applying direct military pressure on Cairo; in this the Kremlin has been singularly successful.

Considering the magnitude of the service rendered Egypt by Soviet military intervention, some observers found the ouster of Soviet personnel in July, 1972, incomprehensible. Yet Sadat's decision was not the bolt from the blue which it appeared to be at the time but was based instead on an accumulation of Egyptian grievances against the Soviet benefactors.

#### CAIRO'S DISSATISFACTION

Moscow's decision to man the front line of Egypt's air defenses was clearly a short-term asset, since it enabled Nasser and Sadat to guarantee the protection of Egypt against Israeli air attacks. However, it was also a long-term liability; in stabilizing the existing situation along the Suez Canal, the Soviets left the waterway closed and the entire Sinai peninsula in the hand of the Israelis. Cairo's resultant restiveness was magnified by the fact that the introduction of Soviet air force units resulted in the establishment of *de facto* Soviet air bases in Egypt, while Soviet naval vessels were widely using the facilities in Alexandria, Port Said and Mersa Matruh.

These incursions on Egyptian sovereignty, along with the overbearing behavior of the Soviet military personnel, would probably have been tolerated a while longer, if the Kremlin had indicated a willingness to use its influence (and military power, if necessary) to force Israel from the Arab territories occupied in 1967. But, as soon became evident, the U.S.S.R. was reluctant either to exert effective pressure on Jerusalem or to supply Cairo with the "offensive" weapons, such as MIG-23 fighter-bombers or medium-range ballistics missiles which, Sadat claims, are indispensable for waging a "successful" war against Israel.

The reasons for Moscow's reluctance to accommodate Egypt are many and complex. In summary, they include a desire to perpetuate the atmosphere of "controlled tension" which has enabled the U.S.S.R. to make and, until July, 1972, to keep its impressive

gains in Egypt, an unwillingness to antagonize the United States at a time when the Kremlin is genuinely interested in an accommodation between the superpowers, and a fear of a possible big power confrontation in the Middle East.

In the meantime, facing serious domestic problems and a sharp decline in Egypt's influence in the Arab world, Sadat, in mid-1971, attempted to restore his waning prestige by threatening to invade the Sinai before the end of the year. In retrospect, it appears that he was also trying to exert pressure on the United States while subtly warning the Soviet Union to "produce" or face the consequences. The year passed and nothing happened. It is instructive, however, that in explaining his inaction, Sadat cited Soviet preoccupation with the Indian-Pakistani conflict as the main reason for his decision not to attack Israel at that time. After the Bangladesh settlement, renewed efforts by the Egyptian leaders to secure a Soviet commitment to help evict Israel from the Sinai were also unsuccessful and, in July, 1972, Sadat ordered the withdrawal from Egypt of most Soviet military personnel. Ironically, then, the very Arab-Israeli conflict which had enabled the Russians to score important military and political gains in the Arab East also led to the exposure of the thin foundation upon which the Cairo-Moscow relationship has been built.

In retrospect, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Soviets in Egypt have overplayed their hand. It is just as important to note, however, that the break between the two countries is by no means complete. Hundreds of Soviet military advisers have remained and, more importantly, Soviet naval units continue to use Egypt's facilities. The reasons for Sadat's determination to avoid a complete break are obvious and his refusal to pursue such a course was predictable: Cairo remains dependent on the Soviet Union for military, political, economic, financial and technical support and for maintenance of and spare parts for its Soviet-made military equipment. It should therefore have come as no surprise that Sadat has recently toned down the anti-Soviet campaign and has endeavored to "renegotiate" a "new relationship" with the Kremlin, as evidenced, in part, by the October, 1972, visit to Moscow of Premier Aziz Sidqi.

Even though Sadat's actions are entirely comprehensible from the perspective described above, there remains yet another curious aspect of the situation. Specifically, the mildness of the Kremlin's reaction to what clearly constituted a public humiliation was even more surprising to some observers than the initial Egyptian decision to oust the Soviet military. The reasons for Moscow's moderate response in this inflammatory situation can only be understood in the context of the more general motives for its Middle Eastern policies.



In the West, Soviet motives have been a subject of considerable controversy. Typical explanations of the Kremlin's behavior in the Middle East have emphasized traditional geopolitical factors, such as the historical search for southern outlets to the sea; ideological considerations, such as the Marxist dictum to hasten the decline of the capitalist world by any and all means; or power-political motivations of the constant search for increasing one's influence in the world and diminishing that of one's rivals. An analysis of these various theories is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that, in this writer's opinion, these are oversimplified explanations of a more complex behavior pattern. For one thing, they disregard the action-reaction process which forms an integral part of international politics. They also take for granted the aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy.

It is, of course, true that many of Moscow's policies and actions in the post-1945 period which were designed to help curtail Western influence deserve to be labelled expansionist. But this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the Kremlin, like any other government, has been primarily concerned with the problem of national security and that many of its actions have been responses to perceived threats from the outside. For instance, Khrushchev's initial move into the underdeveloped world was probably motivated by his desire to weaken the capitalist powers by detaching from them their colonial and dependent areas. In the particular case of the Middle East, however, these general considerations were overshadowed by Soviet anxiety over the Western position of strength, established in the region in the late 1940's and 1950's. More precisely, in the first decade of the cold war, the United States, the only superpower to possess both the atomic bomb and an effective delivery system (the Strategic Air Command), acquired a number of Middle Eastern and North African airfields (in countries like Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan) from which its bombers could easily reach most of the industrial complexes and cities of the U.S.S.R. In the late 1940's, American land-based air power was reinforced by the deployment in the Mediterranean of the United States Sixth Fleet. Aircraft carriers with long-range fighter-bombers on board constituted floating air bases from which the Soviet Union could have been subjected to a nuclear attack. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the United States chose to strengthen its position further by the deployment in Italy and Turkey of intermediate-range Jupiter missiles and by the introduction into the Mediterranean of Polaris nuclear submarines.

This awesome accumulation of destructive power along the southern borders of the U.S.S.R. inevitably aroused grave apprehensions for Soviet security in

the Kremlin, regardless of other interests and objectives in the Middle East. Whether this United States power was there for "defensive" or "offensive" purposes was, in the last analysis, not the main problem facing the Soviet decision-makers. What mattered was that United States power was there and that it could be used against the Soviet Union whenever the United States of America, *for whatever reason*, decided to do so. Therefore, a Soviet countermove in the Middle East was inevitable: Moscow had to attempt to acquire and maintain an operational base in the region in order to be able eventually to neutralize the heavy initial military superiority of the United States.

Efforts to establish close working relations with Egypt and other Arab states and the subsequent deployment in the Mediterranean of a Soviet naval squadron (*eskadra*) were the logical operational extension of these policy imperatives. This does not mean that military-strategic considerations alone were accountable for Soviet policy in the Middle East. But they did provide impetus (and one which is often overlooked by Western analysts), reinforced by political, economic and other considerations.

To a considerable extent, military-strategic factors continue to be as important in 1973 as they were in earlier decades, although the specific composition of these elements has changed. It is true that most United States air bases in the Middle East and North Africa have been abandoned, and that the remaining Turkish airfields are highly vulnerable to a possible Soviet missile attack. Jupiter missiles, too, have been withdrawn. It is equally true, however, that the United States Sixth Fleet and Polaris submarines continue to operate in the Mediterranean.

The perceived necessity of neutralizing United States sea-borne strategic delivery systems dictated the establishment in the Mediterranean of a permanent Soviet naval presence. In facing this task, however, Moscow was confronted with serious logistical problems. The United States Sixth Fleet enjoyed "home-port" privileges in Spain, Italy and Turkey (Greece was added to the list in 1972). But the U.S.S.R., after expulsion from Albania in 1961, had no such bases and, moreover, lacking carriers, had to rely on air support based in Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. An opportunity to acquire naval and air facilities in the Mediterranean presented itself only in the late 1960's when Egypt, unable to defend herself against Israel's deep-penetration raids, made such facilities available to the U.S.S.R. in return for a Soviet-manned modern air defense system. As a result, in the early 1970's, Soviet military posture in the eastern Mediterranean was stronger than ever before. Naval facilities were widely used by the Soviet squadron, while reconnaissance bombers (the "Badgers"),

armed with air-to-surface missiles, were keeping a constant watch over the movements of the United States Sixth Fleet. Moreover, several squadrons of MIG-21 fighters (and some MIG-23 fighter bombers), manned and serviced exclusively by Soviet personnel, were deployed in Egypt.

This heavy dependence on Egyptian facilities explains the many facets of Soviet policy which may otherwise seem obscure. For instance, Moscow's restrained stand on the Arab-Israeli problem becomes more intelligible in the light of Moscow's desire to see tension continue. Only reliance on Russian military and economic backing would prompt the Arabs to cooperate as closely as they have with the U.S.S.R. in recent years. Similarly, Soviet determination, exhibited over the past 17 years, to maintain close relations with Cairo at a considerable cost (in terms of money and prestige) and despite frequent irritation with Egyptian behavior makes considerable sense in the light of the perceived necessity of access to Egyptian facilities. The public affront by Sadat's eviction order is only the most recent and widely publicized of a number of such episodes.

The thrust of this argument is that military-strategic considerations or, to be more precise, a perceived threat to the national security of the U.S.S.R. left the Kremlin no choice but to pursue an active policy in the Middle East. This does not mean that other factors have been absent or unimportant. On the contrary, strategic motivations have been complemented and reinforced by politics and, to a lesser extent, by economics. Once close cooperation with a number of Arab states had been established, the Soviet position has been utilized for various purposes. For example, the presence of Soviet vessels in Egyptian ports in the period between 1967 and 1970 served to deter Israeli air strikes against them. The naval bases also immeasurably facilitated the process of "showing the flag" throughout the Mediterranean and beyond.

There can be little doubt that in implementing its Middle Eastern policy, designed in part to establish a Soviet naval and air presence in the area by manipulating the Arab-Israeli conflict, Moscow gambled and lost. It obviously proceeded on the assumption that Egypt's defeat in 1967 and her subsequent inability to extract concessions from Israel had so reduced Cairo's bargaining power as to make Egypt totally dependent both on Soviet military assistance and on an actual Russian presence. This was only partially correct. With one bold stroke, Sadat proceeded to reassert his independence in spite of heavy reliance on the Soviet Union and, in the process, went as far as publicly to accuse the Kremlin of unwillingness to back its friends effectively in their hour of need.

Prestige aside, the Soviets had to evacuate their air force units with the result that their Mediterranean squadron has been deprived of important reconnaissance and support capabilities. In the process, its effectiveness vis-à-vis the more powerful United States Sixth Fleet has been reduced. Moscow's recent attempts to strengthen Soviet ties with Syria and Iraq must be seen, in part, in the light of these considerations. The *eskadra* has in fact used Syrian naval facilities and, if airfields could be secured in either country or both, the military significance of the loss of the Egyptian bases would be measurably reduced.

What is so intriguing about the present situation is that the Russians appear to have learned little from their previous experiences with the Arab governments. It is difficult to imagine, for example, how airfields in Syria or Iraq, even if they became available, would be any more secure than those recently lost in Egypt. Some Western commentators have argued that the Soviet setback is temporary and that, after Sadat, the Russians are likely to be "reinvited" into Egypt. This may or may not prove correct, but even if it were true, what guarantee is there that they would not once again be asked to leave? What all this means is that, like their "imperialist" predecessors, the Soviets will some day have to come to grips with the fact that the political volatility and hence "unpredictability" of their Arab clients is no foundation upon which to build long-range policy. The Soviet problem is magnified by the fact that the Arabs detest manipulation at the hands of foreign powers, East and West alike, and will attempt to break away from the "big brother" at the first opportune moment.

In conclusion, the prospects for successful implementation of present Soviet policy in the Middle East do not appear bright. While making cautious attempts to establish itself in the Persian Gulf—a task complicated by the closing of the Suez Canal—and to maintain cordial relations with the "northern tier" countries (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan), Moscow still regards Egypt, Syria and Iraq as well as the eastern Mediterranean as its main area of operations. Its continuing reliance on Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, given the instability of Arab politics, can only spell future difficulties for both the U.S.S.R. and others concerned with the affairs of this troubled region.

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Oles M. Smolansky is presently Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and the Middle East Institute of Columbia University. He is the author of the forthcoming book *The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev* and of numerous articles on Soviet-Arab relations.

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*"... A loose alignment exists, for regional purposes, among the nations of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Great Britain and the United States. Opposing this group is an alignment consisting of Iraq, Southern Yemen and, on the periphery, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China."*

## Iraq and the Persian Gulf Region

BY ROY E. THOMAN

*Associate Professor of Government, West Texas State University*

THE NATIONAL ACTION CHARTER, proclaimed by the ruling Arab Baath Socialist party<sup>1</sup> on November 15, 1971, is an ideological statement of great significance. Although it is difficult to prove causal linkages between policy pronouncements and subsequent behavior, the National Action Charter at the very least furnishes a suggestive starting point for understanding the drama of contemporary Iraqi politics.

The charter describes the present era as a "transitional period," during which time legislative and executive powers will continue to be exercised by public bodies as specified in the interim constitution. A major provision in the charter, however, calls for the drafting and promulgation of a permanent constitution.

Concerning the oil industry, the charter states that the freeing of oil resources from all forms of foreign control is "a natural objective of the revolution." The policy to be pursued is that of "wrestling our rights from the clutches of the monopolistic companies whether by action through pan-Arab and international organizations or by measures and laws produced by the state."

Turning to the Kurdish issue, the charter stresses that the March 11 Manifesto provides the right framework for ensuring the legitimate national rights of Iraq's Kurdish people. A number of accomplishments are discussed which have contributed to a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question.<sup>2</sup>

The charter contains an important statement deal-

ing with non-Baathist participation in the government:

The political system built up by the July 17 Revolution under the leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and which seeks the realization of the broadest coalition among all the national, nationalist and progressive forces . . . , is a democratic, popular and unitary system. . . .<sup>3</sup>

While it seems reasonable to assume that the regime is sincere in its desire to carry out the provisions of the March 11 Manifesto, recent developments present a mixed picture concerning the degree of rapprochement achieved thus far. On the positive side, the Revolutionary Command Council (R.C.C.) issued an order in April, 1972, bringing into force the provision in the manifesto calling for the use of the Kurdish language, in addition to Arabic, as an official language in the Kurdish areas. Also, the R.C.C. was able to announce in August that a total of 4,846 Kurds had been reinstated in their jobs since the issuance of the manifesto.

Nevertheless, stories of armed clashes between Kurds and the Baghdad regime continue to leak out of Iraq occasionally. For example, toward the end of June, 1972, it was reported that fighting had taken place between the army and Kurds around Kirkuk and in the western Kurdish town of Sinjar. In the course of the skirmish several Kurdish villages were bombed by the Iraqi Air Force.

In August, the A.B.S.P. accused the Kurdistan Democratic Party (K.D.P.) of receiving heavy weapons from Iran and operating training camps for forces "advocating the overthrow of the national authority." The Baghdad regime also charged that the K.D.P. had turned the *Peshmarga* (the Kurdish irregular army) into a force controlled by the K.D.P. and not by the state.<sup>4</sup>

The Iraqi Communist party (I.C.P.) has a regular membership estimated at about 2,000. There are an additional 10,000 to 20,000 sympathizers who give the I.C.P. sufficient support to allow it to maintain

<sup>1</sup> The Arab Baath Socialist Party (A.B.S.P.) came to power as a result of a *coup d'etat* carried out on July 17, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> On March 11, 1970, the Baghdad regime announced a settlement agreement with the Kurds, thus bringing to a close over eight years of sporadic warfare.

<sup>3</sup> Baghdad Observer, November 17, 1971, p. 2 (italics mine).

<sup>4</sup> *Kayhan*—Weekly Edition (Teheran), August 5, 1972, p. 1.

its position as one of the most influential of the Communist parties in the Arab world.

The legacy of mutual antagonism between the A.B.S.P. and the Iraqi Communist party will not be reviewed here.<sup>5</sup> However, there was some evidence of rapprochement emerging after the Baathist coup of July 17, 1968. In a speech in Moscow in 1969, Aziz Mohammed, First Secretary of the I.C.P. Central Committee, said:

Our party did not let bitter feelings and resentful recollections of the bloody reprisals showered upon Communists in 1963, when the Baath party was in power, influence its attitude to these developments, and proceeded from a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the political situation. . . .<sup>6</sup>

He went on to say that

Our party calls for a national front, for a coalition government based on that front and loyal to the front's character. It also calls for democratic freedoms, and above all freedom of political activity for the patriotic parties and forces. . . .

It soon became apparent, however, that the Baathist leaders had little real inclination to share power with the Iraqi Communist party. The Communists began to complain about Baghdad's vacillating attitude, and even accused the Baathists of persecution.

In view of past behavior, it is therefore not surprising that many regarded the National Action Charter's objective of setting up "the broadest coalition among all the national . . . and progressive forces" with a strong degree of skepticism. Nevertheless, it was announced on May 15, 1972, that President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr had appointed two Communists to serve in his Cabinet. Mukarram al-Talabani, a member of the Central Committee of the I.C.P., was appointed Minister of Irrigation. Amer Abdullah, also a member of the Central Committee of the I.C.P., was appointed to the post of Minister of State. Both men hold law degrees. In addition to the two Communists, the new Cabinet included Kurds, Nasserites and independents.

On the same day the appointments were announced, the Politbureau of the I.C.P. issued a statement concerning the decision to participate in the government:

Last October (sic) the leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party came forward with a draft Charter of National Action, which was positively appraised by our Party as "providing sound foundations for general national co-operation." Making this appraisal . . . the Iraqi Communist Party proceeded from the view that the Charter has

an anti-imperialist orientation: the document stresses the importance of continuing the course of strengthening co-operation with the socialist countries and proclaims full and resolute association of Iraq with the camp of peoples fighting against imperialism, advances a program of progressive socio-economic changes, rejects in principle the capitalist path of development and states that the statement of March 11, 1970, is a firm basis for securing the national rights and aspirations of the Kurdish people, including the right to autonomy.

The aim of our participation in the government is to contribute to foiling the imperialists' attempts to maintain divisions in the ranks of the national forces. We also want to strengthen the position of Iraq in the world democratic movement and to consolidate the ties with the forces acting in support of our people and their progress both in the Arab world and internationally.<sup>7</sup>

The establishment of the national front in May, 1972, gave the impression that the A.B.S.P. was sharing more political power than was actually the case. In fact, the decision to create a national front came at a time when the Baathists felt their position to be, at last, virtually unassailable. By Iraqi standards, a great degree of stability had been achieved by 1972, although at the cost of ruthless purges and the harsh repression of dissent.

In the Iraqi political system, Cabinet ministers are mere dispensers of power. The eleven-member Revolutionary Command Council is the source of political power and is completely dominated by the Baath party. Precautions have been taken to make certain that the military remains loyal to the A.B.S.P. The army of about 80,000 men has been penetrated by between 2,000 and 3,000 Baathist officers known as "the eyes of the Baath." Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary-General of the A.B.S.P. and Vice-Chairman of the R.C.C., was blunt when he declared, "We are not going to permit anyone other than the Arab Baath Socialist Party to engage in political activities inside the armed forces."<sup>8</sup>

## THE IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY

In accordance with the tone set by the National Action Charter, the regime began to press the oil companies, principally the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (I.P.C.), for greater benefits. Negotiations took place during January and February, 1972, but ended in failure.

Several major conflict issues emerged from these negotiations and from other negotiations held intermittently from February through May. First, there was the bitter feeling that had been caused by Law No. 80 of 1961. From 1925 until the passage of this law, the whole of Iraq had been considered a concession for the exploitation of oil by foreign companies. Law No. 80, however, limited their exploitation to an area of not more than .5 per cent of the original concession. The Iraqis justified their action by employing the principle that oil companies had the obli-

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of the earlier history of A.B.S.P.-I.C.P. relations see my article, "Iraq under Baathist Rule," *Current History*, January, 1972, pp. 34-35.

<sup>6</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, 1969* (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1969), p. 320.

<sup>7</sup> *Information Bulletin* (Toronto), August 25, 1972, pp. 37-39.

<sup>8</sup> *Baghdad Observer*, January 3, 1972, p. 4.



gation to relinquish areas not exploited by them within a reasonable time. They viewed a concession as a type of contract, the main objective of which should be the development of the resources of the host country.

The passage of Law No. 80 caused an increase in tension between the Iraqis and the oil companies, with the latter taking the position that they were entitled to full compensation for the "damages and losses inflicted" upon them as a result of the enactment of the law. The Iraqis countered by charging that the oil companies had spitefully exerted economic pressure on the country after the passage of Law No. 80 through, among other devices, the freezing of production rates in Iraq and the underutilization of the full capacity of production. As a result of these alleged machinations on the part of the oil companies, the Iraqis claim that the financial loss to the country amounted to more than 550 million Iraqi dinars<sup>9</sup> for the period 1962-1970.

#### THE BAATHIST GOVERNMENT

Escalation of the conflict followed the coming to power of the Baathists in 1968. The new government took bold measures in enforcing Law No. 80, and implemented a policy of direct exploitation of oil by the state. The Iraqi National Oil Company (I.N.O.C.) was activated, and several agreements with foreign countries were concluded to promote oil production and marketing by the national oil sector.

By the spring of 1972, the conflict had reached the crisis stage. This resulted primarily from the fact that the Iraq Petroleum Company had engaged in a production cutback in the company's northern oil fields, which amounted to 50 per cent in March and April. The company claimed that the high price of Mediterranean-delivered crude oil made it noncompetitive in Europe. (This is oil produced in the northern fields and sent by pipeline through Syria and on to the coast.)

The Iraqi regime viewed the situation as intolerable and claimed that the production cutback from 1.5 million barrels a day to approximately 600,000 had resulted in the loss of \$85,800,000. In mid-May, therefore, the Revolutionary Command Council issued an ultimatum to the I.P.C., giving the company two weeks to submit a "positive offer" concerning the demands advanced by the regime. The R.C.C. warned that otherwise the government would be compelled to take "all legal and legislative measures deemed necessary to safeguard the national interests and legitimate rights" of its people. Among the various demands was one insisting that the I.P.C. raise production rates to the maximum capacity of the pipelines.

In response, Geoffrey Stockwell, managing director of I.P.C., offered a cash payment of about \$266,000,000 in settlement of all outstanding claims against the company (with the traditional qualification that the offer did not constitute an admission of the claims). The offer would have bound the company to increase production to 1.75 million barrels per day by December, 1973, two million barrels per day by 1974, and three million barrels per day by 1977.<sup>10</sup>

It is not entirely clear why the Iraqi government rejected the offer, although the Baathists were undoubtedly irritated by the company's reiteration of its demand for compensation for concessionary rights cancelled by the previous regime in 1961. This highly charged emotional issue had become virtually nonnegotiable.

In any event, on June 1, 1972, the R.C.C. issued a law nationalizing the Iraq Petroleum Company. With total assets and concessions valued at roughly one billion dollars, this was perhaps the biggest single nationalization of an oil producing company's assets in Middle Eastern history. Within a few hours after the Iraqi nationalization announcement, the official Syrian News Agency said that the Baathist regime in Damascus had taken control of the I.P.C. pipeline.

Law No. 69 of 1972, the law nationalizing the I.P.C., provides for the establishment of a government company named the Iraqi Oil Operations Company (I.O.O.C.) to succeed to the assets of the Iraq Petroleum Company. The law also provides for compensation, but the wording of this section of the law indicates that any sum offered will probably be a nominal one.

#### PERSIAN GULF POLITICS

In the realm of regional foreign relations, tension between Iraq and her rival neighbor, Iran, was dramatically heightened when the latter took possession of the three strategic Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb on November 30, 1971. Iran began negotiating for the "return" of the islands about four years ago, after Great Britain announced that she was planning to withdraw her troops from the Persian Gulf.

As a result of a controversial transfer agreement which had been entered into with Sharjah, Iranian armed forces peacefully occupied Abu Musa. No accord could be reached, however, with Ras al-Khaimah, which claimed sovereignty over the two Tumbs, and in the course of the military seizure of Greater Tumb several Iranians and local policemen were killed.

The Iranian position with respect to jurisdictional claims had been stated succinctly by the Shah earlier in the year. "When the British came to the Persian Gulf," he said, "Iran was a weak country and they found it necessary to occupy the islands to combat piracy. But they have always belonged to us and

<sup>9</sup> One U. S. dollar = 2.8 Iraqi dinars (ID.)

<sup>10</sup> *The Times* (London), June 5, 1972, p. 19.

when the British go they cannot give them away to someone else."<sup>11</sup>

Iran's case is based largely on official British documents dating back to the 1830's. In May, 1835, the British political resident in the Persian Gulf, Major Samuel Hennell, had drawn a line south of Abu Musa as the territorial boundary for the Trucial States (including, of course, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah). The Iranians contend that the line, as drawn by Hennell, clearly marks Abu Musa and the two Tumbs as well outside the sphere of influence of the Trucial Coast. Citing other legal and historical sources, the Iranians insist that "the islands have been ours all along."

The islands are important mainly because of their strategic location. They guard the Strait of Hormuz, through which passes about half of the world's oil exports. In view of this fact, Iraq charged soon after Iran's occupation of the islands that the latter's action represented an attempt to deny Iraq access to the open seas and was thus a plot to cut her oil routes.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Ali Khalatbari denied this. He presented his country's action as a strictly defensive maneuver, claiming that by occupying the three islands Iran had made certain that they would not fall into irresponsible hands that could "threaten navigation in the Strait of Hormuz to the detriment of all littoral states."<sup>12</sup>

In response to the Iranian action, Iraq took the extreme step of breaking off diplomatic relations with Iran and Great Britain on December 1.<sup>13</sup> The Iraqis charged "collusion" between Iran and Britain over the islands, and called on other Arab countries to follow Iraq's example. The conspiracy accusation stemmed from the following: (1) The questionable legality of Iran's agreement with the Sheik of Sharjah concerning Abu Musa, and (2) Britain's failure to honor her treaty obligations to defend the territory of the Trucial States from aggression.

In his appearance before an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council on December 9, Talib Shibib, Iraq's representative, noted that the agreement between Iran and the Sheik of Sharjah had been entered into at a time when the United Kingdom was still responsible for the territorial integrity of the Trucial States. Shibib argued that the agreement

between Iran and the ruler of Sharjah was concluded at a time "when the latter had not yet fully regained the right to enter into any international commitment . . . without the consent and approval of the Government of the United Kingdom." By implication, the agreement had either been made without Britain's knowledge, which would thereby render it illegal, or had been entered into under British sponsorship and connivance.

The second accusation, that Britain had failed to honor her treaty obligations to defend the territory of the two sheikdoms from aggression, stemmed from the fact that the Iranian landing on the three islands took place one day *before* the expiration of the treaty. The Iraqis interpreted British passivity to the "aggression" to mean that they condoned the action, and had even conspired with the Iranians. In answer to this charge a British source said, "It was obvious that Britain could not be expected to exercise its responsibilities towards Ras al-Khaimah at this very late stage."<sup>14</sup>

Other dimensions of conflict between Iraq and Iran should be briefly noted. Presumably in retaliation for seizure of the islands, by the end of 1971 Iraq began greatly to accelerate the rate of expulsion of Persian residents of Iraq. By January 8, 1972, Teheran was claiming that some 60,000 Iranians had recently been deported from Iraq. The Iranian government estimated that the total number of people of Iranian origin expelled from Iraq during the previous two years, including these 60,000, would amount to over 120,000.<sup>15</sup> Iraq denied this.

### THE FORMER TRUCIAL STATES

After two years of strenuous diplomatic efforts, a new political entity came into being in the Persian Gulf area on December 2, 1971, named the Union of Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). The six-state union emerged from attempts to set up a federation of all nine Persian Gulf states, but Bahrain and Qatar decided not to join. The new nation grew out of a union of the following Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm al-Quaiwain. It was announced that the six states would abrogate their individual special treaties with Britain and set up a single friendship treaty in their place. The U.A.E. became the 132d member of the United Nations on December 9, 1971.

The Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheik Zayed bin Sultan al-Nhayyan, was proclaimed the first President; Dubai's Ruler, Sheik Rashid bin Saeed, was chosen as the Vice-President; and the Crown Prince of Dubai, Maktum bin Rashid, was selected as Prime Minister. The President and Vice-President will hold office for five-year terms. The first Cabinet included six ministers from Abu Dhabi, four from Dubai, three from Sharjah, two from Umm al-Quaiwain, two from Ajman and one from Fujairah.

<sup>11</sup> *Kayhan* (Teheran), December 1, 1971, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup> *Kayhan* (Teheran), December 14, 1971, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> From the standpoint of immediate economic reprisals, however, the Libyan government took the harshest steps when Colonel Kaddafi announced on December 7 that the British Petroleum Company had been nationalized and that all state deposits were being withdrawn from British banks. This punishment was being meted out because, according to Kaddafi, Britain had "conspired" against the Arab homeland.

<sup>14</sup> *Kayhan* (Teheran), December 2, 1971, p. 1.

<sup>15</sup> *Kayhan*—Weekly Edition (Teheran), January 8, 1972, p. 1.

The Interim Constitution also provided for a National Consultative Assembly. Initially, the Assembly included eight representatives from Abu Dhabi, seven from Dubai, six from Sharjah, and four each from Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Quaiwain. (When Ras al-Khaimah became the seventh state to join the U.A.E. it was allotted six seats.) The Assembly will have annual six-month sessions.

The Assembly, according to the Interim Constitution: (a) Has the power to discuss draft federal laws submitted by the Cabinet; (b) has the right to suggest amendments to these laws, and (c) has the right to be informed of all international treaties and agreements concluded by the Union Government. The obvious conclusion is that this branch of the governmental structure exercises very little power.

Ras al-Khaimah did not immediately join the U.A.E. The emirate's Ruler, Sheik Saqr al-Qassimi, was enraged by the episode involving the two Tumbs, and declared that his emirate would not join unless the rulers of the member states adopted a policy calling for the liberation of the islands from Iranian occupation.

Sheik Zayed al-Nhayyan, President of the U.A.E., came a long way toward meeting Ras al-Khaimah's conditions for membership when he stated:

We protest against Iranian aggression on her neighbors and her occupation of the islands, and are awaiting Arab states to help the . . . Union of Arab Emirates to regain our rights. . . .<sup>16</sup>

He specifically condemned the agreement entered into between Sheik Khalid al-Qassimi, Ruler of Sharjah, and Iranian authorities concerning Abu Musa.

Apparently satisfied that its interests would be promoted by membership, Ras al-Khaimah joined the U.A.E. in time to attend the first session of the National Consultative Assembly, held on February 14, 1972.

## TRouble in Sharjah

The career of the ruler of Sharjah came to a sudden end when he was assassinated in late January, 1972. Sheik Khalid bin Mohammed al Qassimi was found with a single shot through his heart after troops broke into the palace where he had been held hostage. Four other people died and seven were wounded in the fighting. The ruler's cousin, Sheik Saqr bin Sultan, and his supporters who had seized the palace the previous day surrendered after it became obvious that they were hopelessly outnumbered. The armed men who staged the abortive coup had apparently hoped to receive support from Sharjah Town, but instead there was solid backing for the counter coup led by the ruler's brother.

Sheik Khalid had deposed his cousin in a bloodless palace coup some six years prior to his assassination, and Sheik Saqr had spent most of the intervening time in exile in Cairo. As for a motive behind the abortive coup, Sheik Saqr declared after the event, while under house arrest, that he had decided to carry out his plan when Sheik Khalid concluded the agreement with Iran.

A rumor that Iraq had a hand in the attempted coup was nourished by a report in a Kuwaiti newspaper to the effect that the arms used in the attempt were shipped to Sharjah from the Iraqi port of Basrah. This was, however, categorically denied by the Iraqi authorities.<sup>17</sup>

Iraq temporarily withheld diplomatic recognition of the U.A.E. for reasons that roughly paralleled those of Ras al-Khaimah in refusing to join the union immediately. When it became apparent, however, that the leaders of the new state were taking ideologically "correct" positions, opposition to recognition melted away.

## IRAQ AND KUWAIT

Although Kuwait is a small country with a population of only about half a million, its great oil wealth makes it a significant factor in Persian Gulf politics. Until recently, Kuwait was reluctant to align herself too closely with any one regional power. This cautious attitude had been instilled through bitter experience. For example, in 1961 Kuwait gained her full independence from Great Britain only to be threatened with occupation by the Baghdad regime. Sheik Sabbah al-Salem al Sabah called in British troops in July, 1961, and soon afterward the Arab League sent in troops to replace the British. Kuwait's friends were thus able to save her independence.

Leaders in Kuwait adhering to the "old school" of thought concerning the nation's policies argue that Kuwait's safety and prosperity depend on a refusal to identify too closely with a particular side in ideological conflicts. They maintain that Kuwait is wealthy enough to create a model society while, at the same time, she is able to build goodwill by helping in the development of other Arab countries through loans and grants. They view the rule of the al-Sabah family as moderate and benevolent; under no circumstances do they wish to see a radical-leftist group in power.

Spokesmen for the "new school," including a num-

*(Continued on page 37)*

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Roy E. Thoman held the Kentucky Research Foundation Fellowship, the Haggin Fellowship and the William A. Patterson Fellowship while preparing his doctoral dissertation. He has just received a grant from West Texas State University to do research in his field.

<sup>16</sup> *Baghdad Observer*, December 7, 1971, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> *Baghdad Observer*, February 8, 1972, p. 1.

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*Despite friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union,  
"Turkey's basic ties are likely to remain with the West, regardless of the ups  
and downs of Turkish politics."*

## Continuing Trouble in the Turkish Republic

BY HARRY N. HOWARD

*Member of the Board of Governors, The Middle East Institute*

TURKEY'S TIME OF TROUBLES, which extended through the decade of the 1960's, continued into the 1970's, sometimes becoming so serious in disorder and turmoil as to lead to skepticism concerning the future of the Republic. There were threats both from the extreme left and the extreme right in the Turkish political spectrum, and little evidence, at times, of the kind of political compromise evident in mature democratic societies. As was pointed out in Dwight J. Simpson's survey in January, 1972,<sup>1</sup> with the constant threat of "anarchy," on March 12, 1971, the commanders of the Turkish armed forces submitted a final memorandum ("ultimatum"?) demanding a "strong and credible government," which would be able to direct the country and its people in sure and certain directions, in the spirit of Kemalism. It was alleged that both the government and the Grand National Assembly had driven the Turkish people into anarchy, fratricide, and social and economic unrest. Unless their suggestions were followed immediately, the military were prepared to take over political power in Turkey. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel of the Justice party, who had been in office since 1965, resigned, and on March 19, 1971, Nihat Erim, a professor of international law at the University of Ankara and a member of the Republican People's party, became Prime Minister in a non-party of "national union." His government was to endure until April 17, 1972, when persistent troubles forced him to give up the seals of office.<sup>2</sup>

Erim was charged with the difficult task of constituting a government of "national union," along the

lines advocated and demanded by the military leaders, composed of representatives of the major political parties but free of political and ideological bickering and ending the drift toward "anarchy, fratricide and social unrest." The problems were very complicated. The Erim government sought to deal with the issue of law and order, which was hardly unique to Turkey—whatever its peculiar features—by imposing martial law in 11 of Turkey's 67 provinces, including, among others, the three major cities of Istanbul (2,247,630), Ankara (1,208,791) and Izmir (520,686). While disorders continued, by the end of the summer of 1971 they appeared to have subsided if only for a flickering period.

Prime Minister Erim saw Turkey as being in a "rapid phase of developmental change ever since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923."<sup>3</sup> The essential and primary features of the period were the attainment of modernization, industrialization and socio-economic development in a mixed economy, with public and private participation and management, and a pluralistic, democratic political system. In his view, there had been no discontinuity in this development, and he believed that the armed forces, imbued with the Kemalist spirit both in March, 1971, and in the spring of 1972, had acted in the spirit and interest of maintaining a democratic political system, not of imposing a military dictatorship. In his considered judgment, the internal situation had deteriorated so badly that a strong executive was necessary to preserve the basic rights and freedoms enshrined in the Turkish Constitution of 1961. The Erim government stressed four basic problems: 1) the application of reforms and the principles of Atatürk; 2) modernization of administration and economic structures; 3) steps to achieve social justice; and 4) the speedy elimination of social unrest and disorder.

The Erim government submitted proposals to broaden participation in political life and for implementation of the third five-year plan, to begin in 1973. Of special importance was the maximization of the

<sup>1</sup> Dwight J. Simpson, "Turkey: A Time of Troubles," *Current History*, Vol. 62, No. 365 (January, 1972), pp. 38-43, 50.

<sup>2</sup> For background see especially C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1969), 335 pp.; American University, Foreign Area Studies, *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. G. P. O., 1970), Ch. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Nihat Erim, "The Turkish Experience in the Light of Recent Developments," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer, 1972), pp. 145-152.



transition period prior to Turkey's entry and integration into the European Economic Community, or Common Market. One of the fundamental decisions was to promote the development of the industrial sector of the economy and the transition to the manufacture of intermediate industrial commodities. In a letter of March 18, 1972, Erim called upon the chairmen of all Turkish political parties in the Grand National Assembly to examine the new constitutional amendments calling for the establishment of State Security Courts after the end of martial law in the 11 affected provinces, the acceleration of the legislative process, the introduction of new rules to curb obstruction, examination of the state budget in joint sessions of the Grand National Assembly (Senate and National Assembly), and the elimination of extreme left-wing elements from the universities and the state apparatus.

### **ERIM RESIGNS**

Erim tendered his resignation to President Cevdet Sunay on March 27, 1972, in view of the delays in voting his reform program, evidently caused primarily by the split between right and left elements in the Republican People's party and the bitter controversy between that party and martial law commanders, which undermined his support in the Grand National Assembly. At the same time, on March 27, the Turkish National Security Council, composed of the President, the Prime Minister, five Cabinet members and leaders of the Turkish armed forces, called on political leaders to abandon "sterile quarrels" and on the Grand National Assembly to strengthen the executive by granting new powers "in order to eliminate all the possibilities of a fresh crisis and internal disturbances."

On April 3, President Sunay proposed "the suspension of political discussion and conflicts and all activity in the nature of election propaganda." He also urged amendment to the 1961 constitution so that necessary steps could be taken and reforms could be speedily implemented. In the President's view, the government had to be given the required authority until the 1973 general elections. Nevertheless, the Democrat party (41 out of 450 in the National Assembly) moved to censure the Erim government on April 6, and the Justice party, led by Süleyman Demirel, opposed the enactment of special powers for the executive and held that the criticism of the National Assembly was unjustified, as did the Republican People's party. Erim submitted his final resignation on April 17, although he agreed to remain in office until after the state visit of Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny during April 12-18.

President Sunay finally accepted Erim's resignation on the ground that the Prime Minister was "overtired." On April 29, he asked Suat Hayri Ürgüplü to form a Cabinet, which all parties evidently pledged to support on May 10. But on May 12 the Justice

party declared that Turkey needed a government prepared to take the law-and-order steps to eliminate "anarchy" and crush communism at its roots. The President rejected the Ürgüplü Cabinet on May 13, on the ground that it did not measure up to the memorandum of the military chieftains of March 12, 1971, or meet the requirements of Turkey's troubled internal situation—an unprecedented step in Turkey's political life and system. Ürgüplü's primary trouble appeared to lie in the left-right split in the Republican People's party and in the reluctance of members of the Justice party to serve in a Cabinet with members of the somewhat tarnished Democrat party.

President Sunay then called upon Senator Ferit Melen, the Minister of Defense, to form another non-party government, and the Senator agreed to do so on May 15, 1972, although the new Prime Minister retained his own personal membership in the Republican People's party. His announced primary task was to complete all the measures to eliminate anarchy and to carry out economic, social and cultural reforms in accordance with the request of the armed forces of March, 1971. The third Cabinet within the period of 16 months, somewhat more conservative in general outlook than its immediate predecessors, was announced with President Sunay's approval on May 22, 1972. Its 25 members included 17 members of the ETrim Cabinet, eight members of the Justice party, five members of the Republican People's party, and two of the National Republican party. Non-party technicians held the important posts of foreign affairs, interior and commerce. The composition of the new Cabinet, with a program of limited reform, seemed to suggest that the military leaders were willing to accept more limited reforms favorable to the conservative majority, if such reforms promised a return to stability and an end of the 16-month deadlock.

### **THE MELEN GOVERNMENT**

The Melen program of May 29 called for general elections in 1973, but declared it necessary to eliminate anarchy, restore law and order, and fight communism, the extreme right and separatism. If necessary, the new Prime Minister indicated that he would ask for authority from the Grand National Assembly to take further measures and propose constitutional amendments. He called for: 1) rapid realization of reforms to accelerate economic, social and cultural development; and 2) reforms in the fields of justice, finance, public administration, education, agriculture, minerals and petroleum, and electoral laws and procedures.

But Melen opposed "revolutionary reforms," and there was little or no reference to nationalization in his program. In foreign policy, the Prime Minister declared that his government would attach particular importance to relations with the European Economic

Community and affirmed his belief in the necessity of NATO as "the most important factor for peace in Europe." He would improve relations with the United States, while pursuing "good neighborly relations" with the Soviet Union. He would also oppose any aggression against the Turkish community on the island of Cyprus.

The Melen Cabinet received a vote of confidence of 262 to 4, with 24 abstentions, on June 5. But one-third of the National Assembly took no part in the vote, including 68 members of the Justice party and 51 members of the Republican People's party. On September 3, Prime Minister Melen sounded something of an optimistic note, although he indicated that new steps were needed to restore peace and stability to Turkish political life and that, above all, the aims of the memorandum of March 12, 1971, must be achieved. While "anarchic incidents" were now a thing of the past, in his view, and "peace and security" had been restored, this was not sufficient to the needs of the country. Political stability could not really be restored and survive if the democratic regime in Turkey were not "capable of defending itself." Moreover, the Prime Minister insisted on implementation of the reforms which both he and Erim had advocated, since social peace and political stability could not be restored without them. The most urgent of the reforms, he said, should be realized with the cooperation of all political parties.

Meanwhile, there was much instability in the membership of the Republican People's party, which traced its origins to the very foundations of the Republic, under Atatürk. On May 8, 1971, Ismet İnönü, then at least 87 years old, who had served as Prime Minister and President and was second only to Atatürk in his labors for Turkey, resigned as chairman of the party. His resignation followed the action of an extraordinary party convention which gave the party's central directorate a vote of confidence (709-507) on May 7. A left-wing leader, Bülent Ecevit, who had resigned as secretary-general in March, 1971, became chairman in succession to Ismet İnönü on May 14, 1972.<sup>4</sup> Ecevit announced that he would follow a democratic socialist program which would not open the door for the extreme left, but would prevent communism without resorting to fanaticism, force or the violation of freedom of thought. A new Republican party (*Cumhuriyetçi Parti*), composed of 18 members who had resigned from the Republican People's party, was announced on September 4.

### TERRORISM AND DISORDER

Despite the lull in the fall and winter of 1971, and the assertions of Prime Minister Melen, some acts of

terrorism and disorder continued, although in somewhat lower key, and the government attempted to deal with the problem summarily and without compromise. It may be recalled that 18 persons had been condemned to death, 3 sentenced to prison and 3 acquitted in October, 1971. In January, 1972, some 1,800 intellectuals signed a petition calling for an end to the death penalty for political offenses. On January 24, Istanbul was placed under a 24-hour curfew as part of the military campaign against urban terrorists, while martial law was extended from time to time for two-month periods. On February 21, a trial began in Ankara for 227 left-wing extremists and the death penalty was asked for 15 leaders of the outlawed *Dev-Genc*. On March 11, the General Staff announced the dismissal and detention of 57 officers for underground activity, including the passing of arms to terrorists. On March 27, "The People's Liberation Army" kidnapped three foreign radar technicians—two British and one Canadian—who were evidently murdered on March 30, while a commando police force killed the kidnappers. A Turkish DC-9 was hijacked to Sofia, Bulgaria, on May 3, and the next day, General Kemalettin Eken, the chief of the gendarmerie, was wounded in an Ankara ambush. Another hijacking occurred on October 21, when four Turkish terrorists seized a plane bound for Sofia, threatening to blow up the plane and its passengers unless 13 prisoners were released and reforms were carried out in Turkey. That the problems involved serious considerations was indicated in the announcement of the Minister of the Interior on May 24 that, during March-April, 1972, 432 had been arrested, bringing the total number of detentions since the introduction of martial law to 2,050, with 687 convicted and sentenced by martial law courts, 111 still in custody, and 807 in the course of being tried. On October 18, it was announced that a martial law court in Ankara had sentenced 13 leaders of the outlawed Turkish Labor party, including the chairman, Behice Boran, to 15 years in prison. A graduate of the University of Michigan, Mrs. Boran was the first woman to head a Turkish political party.

### THE TURKISH ECONOMY

Despite social unrest and disorder, with all the political instability they implied, the Turkish economy showed signs of continued, if somewhat uneven, development. Definite progress appeared to have been made during the first two five year plans (1963-1972), although there were some serious problems in agriculture, industrial development and production, export and import policies and balance of payments, and a lack of trained managers, technicians and capital. Inaugurated in 1963, the overall objective of the planned economy was to raise the economic well-being of the nation within the limits of social justice and to

<sup>4</sup> Ismet İnönü resigned from the RPP on November 5, 1972, when the party withdrew from the Melen government.

orient the distribution of the labor force from agricultural toward industrial services.<sup>5</sup>

The first two plans called for an annual investment of some 20 per cent and an increase of 7 per cent annually in the GNP. The overall objective for the entire period, 1963–1977, also included an annual rate of growth of 7 per cent, with an increase in the GNP from some £T 52,700,000,000 (\$3,513,333,333) to £T 144,300,000,000 (\$9,620,000,000) in 1977. It also calls, among other things, for enough increase in the number of skilled workers and high-level scientific and technical personnel to meet the requirements of domestic industry.<sup>6</sup>

Despite significant political and economic problems, with some 2,000,000 unemployed and severe inflation, the year 1971 looked good and the prospects for 1972 looked reasonably good. Some 600,000 Turkish workers were employed in Europe, primarily in Germany. Labor remittances, the most important single element in the Turkish international balance of accounts, totaled some \$273,000,000 in 1970, and reached almost \$500,000,000 in 1971 and 1972. Those who have returned home provide a pool of trained workers for new industrial ventures in Turkey. Prime Minister Erim announced on January 1, 1972, that the GNP had grown 9.4 per cent during 1971, 24 per cent higher than the second plan had called for. The new budget, approved on February 29, 1972, was in the amount of £T 51,968,000,000 or \$3,464,533,333. The third five-year plan, under which Turkey expected to achieve a greater degree of economic independence, was finally approved by the National Assembly on October 26, by a vote of 193 to 98.

## WORLD AFFAIRS

Both Prime Minister Erim and Prime Minister Melen (May 29, 1972) reaffirmed their fidelity to NATO, and both held to the primacy of the American connection within the grand alliance. There was, indeed, no indication of any basic change in Turkey's international position, although there were some very fundamental problems. Prime Minister Melen put

the matter succinctly in his government program when he stated he would seek to improve Turkey's relations with the United States and to pursue good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union. A sense of realism obtained.

The relationship with the United States had, of course, endured since the end of World War II, and more especially since the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, and the beginnings of American assistance to Greece and Turkey. The importance of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East seemed self-evident to American leaders in the development of the containment policy relative to the U.S.S.R. During the period 1946–1971, the United States extended no less than \$5,692,400,000 in assistance to Turkey, with \$2,917,700,000 in military and \$2,727,700,000 in economic assistance (\$1,208,400,000 grant).<sup>7</sup> The alliance has continued. Like the course of true love, the alliance of states seldom runs smoothly. In part the problems were a development of the changed context of world politics, as the cold war appeared to wane, and even the United States and the U.S.S.R. seemed to move toward a possible détente.

The alliance seemed less vital, perhaps, to both parties, as the threats which brought it about appeared less real or imminent.<sup>8</sup> In part, too, an alliance between advanced societies (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany), for example, and developing societies like Turkey generates obvious problems, and the relationships between states of this character are seldom smooth. It is also true that advances in military technology may have altered the significance of the eastern Mediterranean in American global calculations, although there is no evidence that they have rendered the southeastern NATO flank obsolete.

But other problems also served to loosen the ties of alliance. Among these was the problem of Cyprus, which brought Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, into bitter and continuous controversy. The United States was placed in a very difficult position. At the heart of the problem was the question of how the Greek and Turkish communities on the island could live together and what their relations with Greece and Turkey should be. The constitution of the Republic

(Continued on page 38)

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Harry N. Howard is a former Professor of Middle East Studies in the School of International Service at American University, and a retired Foreign Service Officer. His books include *The Partition of Turkey, 1913–1923* (New York: Fertig, 1931, 1966), *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington: U.S.G.-P.O., 1947), and *The King Crane Commission* (Beirut: Khayat, 1963).

<sup>5</sup> See especially *First Five Year Development Plan, 1963–1967* (Ankara, 1967), Section II, which deals with the 15-year period.

<sup>6</sup> See American University, Foreign Area Studies, *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1969), Ch. 18; Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey, "Turkish Industry and the Five-Year Plans," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer, 1971), pp. 337–354.

<sup>7</sup> See the masterly treatment of George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1972), 263 pp.; Parker T. Hart, Special Editor, "America and the Middle East," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 401 (May, 1972), pp. 1–141, especially the articles of Raymond A. Hare, Joseph Satherthwaite, Parker T. Hart and Harry N. Howard.

<sup>8</sup> But see Parker T. Hart, "The Vital Importance of the Northern Tier," *The Middle East*, No. 49 (October, 1972), pp. 23–26.

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*"The belief that the restoration of Arab dignity and respect from the rest of the world could only come from Arab unity floundered on the intra-mural rivalries of the North African leaders, disagreement over boundaries which led to the Moroccan-Algerian war of 1963, divergent political perspective and, most tormenting of all, the Arab debacle at Israeli hands in June, 1967." Today, this specialist believes, interdependence "should place interregional relationships on a firmer, more constructive footing. . . . In mutual dependence lies the true hope for mutual respect."*

## North Africa and the Power Balance

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS

*Middle East and Africa Specialist*

EVERY ETHNIC GROUP and tribal society has its inherited traditions and quaint conceits. The people of the Western world are no exception. One of the folkloric beliefs passed along by successive generations of Western scholars is the notion that Western institutions and values are a driving force in the international arena, and that they are gaining widespread recognition as well as universal acceptance.

Underpinning our conceit is the belief that international politics is a deadly game in which all nations seek to control or influence one another's decision-making processes. The dominant players are the so-called advanced or developed nations; the objects of the competition are less-developed counterparts—often rich in resources, sometimes occupying positions of significant strategic location, not infrequently tied by recent colonial history to the West.

What keeps the competition for preeminent position or influence within manageable bounds is the existence of certain clearly defined rules of engagement. Traditionally these have included agreed spheres of influence, accepted balances of regional power and, where necessary, self-denying ordinances. The ultimate purpose of such arrangements has been to avoid carrying rivalry to the point of self-destroying conflict among the developed countries.

North Africa (in Arabic: *Maghreb es-Aksa*) would appear to substantiate our notions about international affairs. Until recently an area of French and Italian colonial dominion, it has long been an international stage across which have poured countless marauding tribes and conquering civilizations. As a result, the more than 30,000,000 people who populate North Africa mirror a rich array of cultures and historical forces, ranging from Arab and Turkish influences to more contemporaneous layerings.

The lengthy chronicle of conquest has led some

Western specialists to regard the *Maghreb* as an object akin to an empty vessel into which all manner of foreign values have been and continue to be poured. The image painted of the average *Maghrebian* is one of passivity. What complexity exists is explained by Western specialists as the product of the competition between traditional culture (Arab-Islamic) and Western values.

In social-cultural terms, the Western view represents an adaptation of the celebrated *gemeinschaft* theory. At its core is the belief that all societies are undergoing a process of continuous change from small, organic, status-oriented communities to large, bureaucratic, industrialized entities. At one end of the spectrum is the extended family and the tribe; at the opposite extreme is the highly complex, technologically developed nation-state.

This process, characterized as modernization, is held to be intrusive, almost universal in application. It is part of an inescapable process. *Thus, it is in events that thy tribe shall forever wander, finding in the shade of each tree a seeming haven till it be shown that as the sun moves, the shadow moves, leaving thee unsheltered.*

What the average Western scholar frequently ignores is the sense of pride that most North Africans retain with respect to their history, culture and traditions. In the case of tiny Tunisia, for example, the memory of three centuries of Hafsid rule still obtains. Its late medieval culture included the Almohade imprint, which extended throughout much of North Africa. By blending it with Ottoman influence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Tunisia evolved her own distinctive system of government and bureaucracy long before the impress of French civilization toward the latter decades of the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless, French colonial rule, beginning in



Algeria in the 1830's, and subsequently extending to Morocco and Tunisia, did leave its mark. Gallic educational values, financial systems and business practices continue to influence large numbers of North Africans. Similarly, it is to France that the educated *Maghrebien* looks for his literature, technical training and cultural gratification. Beyond this point, however, the basic stratum of North African society prefers to look to indigenous resources for answers to its daily problems and for its guidelines to the future.

### THE POLITICAL-MILITARY DIMENSION

North Africa, since World War II, has passed through three well-defined stages—the nationalist, the multi-polar and the “consociational.” Each has been hallmarked by the elimination of all vestiges of colonial rule, the diversification of external influences, and the growth of self-confidence on the part of North Africans with respect to their rightful role in the world at large.

From the perspective of the *Maghrebien*, the past 20 years have been filled with hope, promise, fulfillment and frustration. The struggle for independence represented a heroic period, in which the Istiqlal party of Morocco, the Neo-Destour party of Morocco, and Algeria's National Liberation Front served as the vanguard of the struggle. With independence, however, new realities and challenges had to be met—most particularly, how to order national priorities and who should assume the mantle of leadership.

Frustration was bound to succeed exultation. In Morocco, political parties fell to quarrelling over the division of power, and the death of the greatly revered King Mohammed V in 1961 proved particularly unsettling. In Algeria, the liberation leaders brought the country to the verge of civil war, a crisis that aborted with the deposition of the eccentric Ahmed Ben Bella by his Minister of Defense, Houari Boumedienne, in June, 1965. Only in Tunisia and Libya did the process of transition to independence prove to be tranquil, in large part because of the roles played by Habib Bourguiba and King Idris. Each proved a singular leader, with the personal qualities needed to meet the pressures and difficulties that political independence posed for their countries.

Whatever the episodic crisis of the moment, one process proved ineluctable. Colonial influence diminished each year. The prime indicators were: (a) the reduction in the number of European “settlers” to be found in the rich agricultural zones of the *Maghrebien* states; (b) the growing extension of government in what might be described as para-statal operations; and (c) the inexorable process of “debasement” that occurred in the military sphere.

The latter process is particularly instructive. Long before the thaw in the cold war, most North African leaders determined that their soil should not serve as a geographical extension of Western strategic plans

vis-à-vis the Communist nations. As a result, Western base complexes underwent a process of closure, thus testifying to the independence of North Africa. Beginning with the installations operated by the American Strategic Air Command in Morocco (1959), bases were evacuated in Tunisia, particularly at Bizerte, and Algeria, most notably at Mers-el-Kebier. The decision of the military Revolutionary Command Council which toppled King Idris from power in September, 1969, to request the removal of the United States and British military presence was honored by the latter the following year, bringing to an end the last major Western military bases in North Africa.

Thus, by mid-1972, the only vestige of the Western military presence was to be found in Morocco, where the United States maintained a small communications complex in the area around Kenitra (formerly Port Lyautey). For purposes of analysis, however, North Africa had lost its erstwhile significance as a Western military sanctuary in a bipolar world.

### THE EMOTIONAL DIMENSION

Paradoxically, as the pace of decolonization accelerated in the 1960's, the emotional climate with regard to the West tended to deteriorate. Frustration piled on frustration. The belief that the restoration of Arab dignity and respect from the rest of the world could only come from Arab unity floundered on the intramural rivalries of the North African leaders, disagreement over boundaries which led to the Moroccan-Algerian war of 1963, divergent political perspectives, and, most tormenting of all, the Arab debacle at Israeli hands in June, 1967. The latter melancholy chapter led a number of Arab states to break diplomatic relations with the United States, commonly believed to be Israel's principal protector and benefactor.

The ostensible corollary to Arab unity has been neutrality in cold war matters, including nonalignment with the “great powers.” Libya, in particular, has been vocal in her expressions of resentment over United States policy towards the Palestine question; she has balanced this with suspicion concerning Soviet objectives in the Arab world. Put bluntly, in the view of Colonel Qadhafi and his Revolutionary Command Council colleagues, the “great powers” are imperialist self-seekers interested only in using the weak and divided Arabs for their own nationalist ends. Hence, the best defense is to keep these powers at arms' length, to strive to close the gap on Arab unity, and to multilateralize dependence on the non-Arab world.

This is not an isolated view of non-Arab nations shared merely by a small coterie of Libyan rulers. A basic mistrust of “great power” objectives and intentions pervades much of North Africa, together with the belief that the powers continue to pursue hege-

monistic goals through devious means. As a result, an ingrown reserve exists when possibilities of mutual accommodation are scouted, including proposals for common initiatives—political, diplomatic or economic.

Probably no recent action underlined the depth of local sentiment more clearly than the affirmative reaction that greeted the fedayeen attack upon the Israeli participants in the Olympics at Munich. Not only was the West German government excoriated for its efforts to subdue the Arab attackers, but, upon the release of the latter, they were greeted as larger than life heroes in Libya. This popular sentiment was shared by others in the Maghreb. Significantly, the Arab nations have formed a common front in efforts to frustrate the American-sponsored initiative within the United Nations to develop an effective program against international terrorism.

### AN ALTERED POWER BALANCE

At a different level of reality, a profound change has begun to take place in the Maghreb's relations with the "powers." Slowly, almost imperceptibly, the balance point has begun to move toward greater equilibrium.

The factors and forces producing this shift are diverse and thus difficult to draw together into a precise analytical construct. Clearly, the end of the period of cold war confrontation—hallmarked by SALT, the initiation of discussions on European security and balanced force reduction, and recent United States-Soviet trade agreements—has ushered in an optimistic feeling that change is possible in a tension-filled international community. Equally providential might be the termination of hostilities in Southeast Asia through interlocking cease-fire arrangements.

Of particular significance has been the virtual disappearance of the post-World War II bipolar pattern of relationships. As a result, Soviet hegemony over the Communist world has been breached, probably irrevocably. Despite the Soviet use of troops to repress the peoples of East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the desire for independence grows among Communist nations.

During the same period, American influence over non-Communist nations has also declined appreciably. This eclipse reflects, in part at least, the end of Soviet Communist world hegemony; but it also results from the resurgence of West Europe, Japan, and a number of other states. The European Community members, for example, now command a total gross national product nearly equal to that of the United States while Japan, with about half our population, has a total wealth which is one-fourth that of the United States. Moreover, the Japanese economy is growing more rapidly than our own.

These fundamental alterations in the balance of power have opened new opportunities for the North

African states to solidify their independence and to assert themselves on the international stage.

### DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

Within the past year, an active path of diplomacy has been followed by each of the North African states. Morocco has hosted a special summit meeting of the Organization for African Unity in an effort to further continent-wide solidarity. In addition, the Moroccan-Algerian border problem was quietly resolved in mid-1972. For her part, Libya has formed a confederation with her neighbor, Egypt, and hopes to fashion a formal political union by September, 1973. Syria also is a member of the confederation.

Algeria has not been found wanting with respect to political and economic initiatives. Having celebrated the tenth anniversary of independence on July 5, 1972, the Boumedienne regime demonstrated that its revolutionary fervor had not waned by continuing to assist liberation movements in southern Africa, bolstering ties with Cuba, and lending support for the "forces of revolution" in South Vietnam. Although she has pushed for closer Maghrebian links, Algeria's radical image has produced circumspection on the part of the more conservative leaders of Morocco and Tunisia, King Hassan and President Habib Bourguiba. However, increased attention is being devoted to the creation of a "Greater Economic Maghreb," one which could attract the attachment of Mauritania and, conceivably, Libya.

Noteworthy among recent Maghrebian diplomatic undertakings was the April 8, 1972, call by the Algerian Foreign Minister for a Mediterranean Security Conference of non-bloc littoral states. The publicly stated purpose of the conference is to remove regional tensions which are attributed by the government of Algeria to the presence of the Soviet and the United States fleets. Yugoslavia has backed this call. However, the question of participation remains to be resolved, with Yugoslavia wishing to confine the participants to "nonaligned" states, while Algeria would include Albania, France and Spain. Both, on the other hand, have insisted that the proposed meeting is an essential precondition for a nonaligned Mediterranean state voice in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which might overlook regional interests without Mediterranean state participation.

*(Continued on page 40)*

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William H. Lewis has taught at George Washington University and the University of Michigan and writes frequently for professional journals. He is editor and co-author of *New Forces in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), and *French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (New York: Walker & Co., 1965).

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### On the Middle East

THE PERSIAN GULF, IRAN'S ROLE. By ROUHOLLAH K. RAMAZANI. (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1972. 157 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

According to Rouhollah Ramazani, "the British departure from the territories and waters of the vast strategic area east of Suez [in 1971] after more than a century of supremacy has presented the international system with the challenge of a new zone of simmering conflicts gripping numerous old and new, small and middle, great and super powers in the Persian Gulf."

Because the Persian Gulf area contains almost two-thirds of the non-Communist world's proved oil resources, increasing Western dependence on this area is a political and economic fact for the near future. With the withdrawal of the British, United States naval strategy has dictated increased United States pressure in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to counteract the growing Russian strength in the East African-Indian Ocean region. Ramazani believes that "the gap between the rhetoric of the [present] Soviet-American hands-off policy and the reality of Soviet-American rivalry will probably widen in the near future, largely because both superpowers, in fact, perceive their interests in the Persian Gulf to be too important to allow them to pursue a policy of complete noninvolvement."

At the same time the Persian Gulf states are involved in their own internal and external problems in the new political situation created by British withdrawal. Iran is the most powerful of these states, a leading producer of oil, with close ties to the United States and geographical proximity to the U.S.S.R. The future of the Gulf region is closely tied to the role Iran plays and wishes to play in the future. Iran has believed, rightly or wrongly, that the Persian Gulf has been an Iranian Sea for centuries and she has controlled large areas abutting the Persian Gulf whenever she had the necessary power. While British power dominated the region in the last few hundred years, Iranian influence was at a particularly low ebb and she was beset by constant internal problems. Now, with the emergence of Mohammed Riza Shah Pahlavi as a strong figure and with a stable domestic situation, Iran is interested in regaining her former eminent position among the Gulf states.

Professor Ramazani feels that once again, as in the days of Darius the Great, Iran is prepared to

play an active role in Gulf politics. Iran has taken an unprecedented interest in the world arena with the Gulf region perceived as "the most sensitive area" of Iran's new foreign policy. Should Iran's future policies tend to be accommodative to the other states in the region, "Iran might finally realize its historic national aspirations within a framework of adjustment with Arab nationalist goals. . . . The semblance of 'pluralistic' regional order might develop on the basis of the two principles presently guiding Iran's role in the Persian Gulf; reliance on [feudal] power for maintaining security [at home] and recognition of Iran's special responsibility because of its leading power position." Future American policies in the region will be a prime force in shaping the future development of Iran.

Ramazani is a Middle Eastern scholar of repute. His present work is a well-written analysis of the past, present and future of Iran as the strong member of the Persian Gulf countries, and of her role in the larger world political domain.

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By TARUN CHANDRA BOSE. (New York: Asia Publishing House, Inc., 1972. 208 pages, appendices and index, \$6.50.)

The events of the last several months in the Middle East indicate a quickening of the pace of events towards a resumption of large-scale armed conflict. Tarun Bose feels that "this region . . . has been the scene of turmoil and violence since the creation of Israel in 1948. The establishment of the Jewish state resulted in an immediate conflict between it and the Arab states—a conflict that has been raging for over two decades. The involvement of the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—in the region has made the matter more complicated." Bose describes the history of the Middle East since 1945 and tries to show why the United States and Russia feel it necessary to be involved in the region.

Prior to 1945, United States contact with the Middle East was limited largely to some penetration by American oil companies. With the decline first of British influence and then of French influence after World War II, it "fell to the United States to step into the breach to prevent the influx of communism. . . . Since the Truman Doctrine was enunciated in 1947, the United States set as its major task in the Middle East the blocking of the expansion of Soviet power into that area and the preven-

tion of Soviet dominance or control over one or more states in the Middle East."

Bose shows the involvement of the United States and Russia with the countries of the Middle East and describes how they have avoided a major confrontation with each other. He believes that the Russians have interests they will go far to support, but does not believe they will stoke up a war in a situation they cannot fully control. In terms of location, resources and possible influence on world politics, the Arab states are more important to the United States than Israel; therefore the United States must try to keep the Middle East from Communist control by maintaining friendly relations with the Arab states while continuing its commitment to Israel. He argues that the Russians believe that a change in the balance of power in the Middle East can have far-reaching repercussions.

It is Bose's opinion that a "lasting peace in the Middle East is not likely to be achieved without a fundamental understanding between the two superpowers—an understanding that would ban the supply of armaments to both the contestants; remove the area from the grip of the Cold War . . . ; finally impress upon both Arabs and Israelis that some mutual concessions must be made and risks taken. . . . otherwise the situation is likely to deteriorate. . . ." In the fall of 1972, these words appear to be all too true.

The author has documented a most important period of Middle East history. It is to be regretted that his work was written before the Soviet egress from Egypt in early 1972; his observations about that event would be worth reading.

**JORDAN: A STUDY IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1921–1965).** BY NASEER H. ARURI. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nyhoff, 1972. 206 pages, bibliography and index, 34 Guilders.)

The author believes that "this book provides a historical perspective to the critical issues which may determine the present struggle not only in Jordan but in the entire area of the Middle East." He details the history of Jordan, using original Arab sources in many cases. Jordan was created in chaos out of a combination of a British strategic interest and the desire of an itinerant Arab warrior, Abdullah, for a throne. Since 1921, Jordan has had a troubled existence. Although she has been established as a state she has not become a nation. She has never been able to develop a consensus as "to the legitimate means and ends of political action." The nation is still attempting, with numerous internal and external difficulties, to find stability.

This is a detailed and well-documented study of a troubled country whose very existence has been

threatened constantly by the turmoil of the Middle Eastern political cauldron.

**THE FALL OF JERUSALEM.** BY ABDULLAH SCHLEIFER. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. 247 pages, \$7.50.)

In June, 1967, Israeli troops completed the conquest of Jerusalem; Israel has since controlled the entire city. This is a most important point of difference between Israel and her Arab enemies. Both sides in the Middle East conflict have strong ties with the ancient city, and an eventual solution to the conflict must consider the future of Jerusalem as an important consideration in any lasting peace settlement.

Schleifer was present in Jerusalem at the latest conquest of the city. He writes sympathetically of the history of the city and its people and of the problems that must be faced by all concerned.

**MAPAI IN ISRAEL.** BY PETER Y. MEDDING. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 326 pages, bibliography and index, \$16.50.)

The Mapai party led the struggle for the independence of Israel and governed the country from 1948 to 1969 when it gave up an independent identity to become a major partner in the Israeli Labor party. Medding's carefully written study of the party is the history of Israeli politics and government during this period.

**IRAN.** BY YAHYA ARMAJANI. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972. 182 pages and index, \$6.95.)

The history of Iran is long and troubled, dating back to the Persian empire of Cyrus the Great. Even in recent times, her path has not been smooth. The present ruler, Mohammed Riza Shah Pahlavi, was crowned in 1967, twenty-six years after he took the oath of office in 1941, as crisis followed crisis. Iran and her ruler have continued to exist, and recently celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire. Armajani writes of the ancient land and the contemporary country which once again seeks a position of leadership in the world.

**THE DISINHERITED, JOURNAL OF A PALESTINIAN EXILE.** BY FAWAZ TURKI. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. 156 pages, \$5.95.)

Fawaz Turki writes movingly of his life as a Palestinian refugee in the Lebanese exile camps. Furki managed to complete his education in England and has become a teacher and writer.

O.E.S.



## EGYPT AND THE SOVIET EXODUS

(Continued from page 16)

Reactions in the army seemed to be positive but not wholly uniform. By mid-October, it appeared that some junior officers, while certainly not pro-Soviet, doubted the wisdom of rejecting Soviet technical expertise. On October 12, a young army captain led a group of three tanks through the center of Cairo to a mosque in which he delivered a "sermon" critical of Sadat's decision.

In the Arab world at large, reactions varied depending on the ideological and political preferences of the groups and individuals in question. The conservatives and moderates (and this included also King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hussein of Jordan) were pleased with the decision. The leaders of the revolutionary states did not respond uniformly. Colonel Qadhafi of Libya not only remained loyal to Sadat but went so far as to press for a complete union between Libya and Egypt, which was duly pledged on August 2 in the bipartite Benghazi Declaration. But Syria's Assad was embarrassed in view of his recent arms deals with Moscow. And Iraq's Hassan al-Bakr remained silent, while forging closer links with Moscow.

The third group—the Arab Left, including the Communists and the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—remained critical of Sadat's policy. So were certain intellectuals of a broadly progressive orientation.<sup>16</sup> The non-Communist critics adopted a negative attitude toward Sadat's decision for the following reasons: (a) it weakened Egypt militarily and left her "naked" in the face of Israel's preponderance; (b) by removing Soviet support, Egypt lost a "sanction" (i.e., a lever of pressure) against the United States; (c) the decision, even if substantively correct, was tactically premature: "You don't quit the job before securing a new one first" (i.e., before obtaining adequate guarantees of support from Washington); (d) the decision was poorly timed, considering that before the November, 1972, elections United States policy would be dormant or paralyzed; (e) it was an illusion to count on the United States and the West in general in view of their close ties with Israel and Zionism.<sup>17</sup>

Somewhere between the praise and the scolding one could discern a third, mediating, trend which aimed at reconciliation of differences between Cairo and Moscow. On the official level, we find in this group President Assad of Syria, and on the unofficial level, men like Kamal Jumblat of Lebanon and Abdur

Rahman Sharkawi, editor of *Rose al-Yussef* of Cairo. It is likely that Premier Aziz Sidky of Egypt and General Ahmed Ismail, Chief of Army Intelligence, also shared this view. The mediating trend began to emerge to the fore by October, and there were signs that Sadat, though with reservations, was allowing conciliatory policies to be initiated.

### AMERICAN REACTIONS

The news of the ouster of the Russians was first received in Washington with interest mixed with scepticism. United States Defense Secretary Melvin Laird expressed doubts as to the scope of the Soviet withdrawal from Egypt.<sup>18</sup> For nearly three weeks, there was no official reaction from the United States Department of State, although there was no attempt to conceal satisfaction with the turn of events in Egypt. It was only on August 11 that Secretary of State Rogers spoke on this subject at a press conference. The gist of Rogers' remarks was that it would be improper for the United States government to comment on what was essentially an internal matter for Egypt. This cautious and noncommittal attitude no doubt reflected the belief that any interference in this Soviet-Egyptian affair and, especially, any overt expression of approval might only complicate President Sadat's already difficult position while bringing no benefit to the United States. It was clearly in Sadat's interest to affirm what had undoubtedly been the truth, namely, that the decision was his own, neither inspired nor dictated by foreign quarters. Hence the official American reticence.

This hands-off attitude, however, could not be regarded in the long run as a substitute for a purposeful policy. Such a policy would have to determine whether a leader like Sadat was desirable at this historical juncture in Egypt, and whether an alternative to him would not open a Pandora's box of new woes for Egypt and the world at large. Should the verdict on Sadat's desirability be positive, it would call for action aiming at the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in a way that would not undermine his position while remaining consistent with the principles propounded by the United States since the June war of 1967.

While this American policy awaited clarification—more likely to be obtained after the November elections—Egypt did not remain at a standstill. In mid-October, on Sadat's instructions, Premier Aziz Sidky made a trip to Moscow. The first Soviet-Egyptian communiqué at the end of the visit spoke of the continuity of friendship between the two countries and stipulated further arms aid to Egypt "to the best of [Soviet] ability"—a vague phrase permitting varying interpretations. No mention was made of the return of Soviet advisers, and it was doubtful whether such

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<sup>16</sup> For a typical stand, see Clovis Maksoud in *An-Nahar* (Beirut), July 19, 1972.

<sup>17</sup> The quoted expressions are those of Clovis Maksoud.

<sup>18</sup> *The New York Times*, July 21, 1972.

## ISRAEL

*(Continued from page 4)*

funds allocated for the purchase of Phantoms, Skyhawks, tanks, armored cars, and electronic equipment from abroad are sacrosanct.”<sup>9</sup> If no important budget savings can be achieved through a reduction of defense expenditures, then the obvious alternative steps would be a freeze on wages, a cutback on the present high volume of imported consumers goods, a governmental insistence on sharply increased labor productivity, and higher personal income taxes intended to reduce purchasing power and dampen inflation. Such steps would entail the gravest political risks, however, and it is therefore unrealistic to expect the Meir government to act vigorously along these lines, especially in view of the fact that the Israeli general elections are scheduled for November, 1973.

The magnitude of the risks involved in proclaiming a stern economic policy were sharply pointed out to the Meir government in late 1971 by Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the secretary-general of Histadut, the labor organization to which nearly 75 per cent of the Israeli labor force belong. Ben-Aharon expressed extreme displeasure with widespread poverty and poor living conditions in Israel, and called upon the government to embark immediately upon greatly expanded housing, schooling and job training programs. Within six months after calling for an expanded social service expenditure, Ben-Aharon resigned from his leadership post in Histadut, charging the Meir government with unwarranted interference in a labor dispute in the economically important canning industry. He has since returned to the secretary-general's post where he continues his sharp struggle against the government on behalf of most of the Israeli labor force.

## THE SUCCESSION

Although the need for reforms in the Israeli economy is grave, it does not compare in importance to the seriousness of the problem of finding a successor to Prime Minister Golda Meir. Mrs. Meir is now 75, and although she remains in good health she has indicated several times her willingness and desire to step down from the Prime Minister's post after her term expires in November, 1973. The political scramble among would-be successors to Mrs. Meir is on in full force. Two avowed contenders are Defense Minister General Moshe Dayan, who is 58, and Deputy Prime Minister General Yigal Allon, who is 55. These two rivals are at odds on most questions, particularly security matters and Arab affairs. General Dayan, a flamboyant, charismatic figure, has taken a very hard

line on the crucial matter of the occupied Arab territories, and has made known his view that the present borders of Israel, with only a few very minor adjustments, should be permanent. General Allon is somewhat more conciliatory on this point, but his counter-suggestions on the subject of Israel's future borders suffer from vagueness and a lack of concrete details.

The quarrels of these two men extend widely over the whole spectrum of Israeli politics. For instance, following the Munich tragedy, Dayan and Allon openly blamed each other for the failure of security arrangements to protect Israel's Olympic team. A basic question regarding both men is whether either is of the stature required for Israel's highest political office. Dayan is a self-centered man with an abrasive personality. He is known to be impatient with subordinates, and has an intense dislike for the administrative details of public office. Allon is a scholarly, introspective man who is relatively colorless, especially when compared to Dayan. Allon is also widely suspected to be too “dove-ish” with regard to Israel's security.

In light of these factors, other possible candidates to succeed Mrs. Meir are Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Minister of Commerce and Industry and former Chief of the General Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, and the perennial candidate and ex-protegé of Israeli elder statesman David Ben-Gurion, the Minister of Transport, Shimon Peres. However, none of these men commands the support among the electorate necessary for a serious candidacy. If one of them were to become Prime Minister it would probably be because of an irreconcilable division in the electorate on the candidacies of the major contenders.

Mrs. Meir probably prefers Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir as her successor. Sapir is 66 and is relatively colorless, although at the same time he is very able and functions as a potent behind-the-scenes figure in the Meir Cabinet. He has said on several occasions that he does not aspire to be Prime Minister, but most observers feel he could be prevailed upon to accept the post. Mrs. Meir has great confidence in Sapir, and may call the elections earlier than the scheduled November, 1973, date in order to aid his candidacy.

These are the notes struck by observers of Israel as the country enters her silver anniversary year: Israel is militarily strong behind easily defensible borders, but permanent peace remains beyond her grasp. Her economy is flourishing, even booming, but her labor force is badly disaffected. Her relationships with the United States are on the eve of great stress and strain; the Nixon administration appears ready to begin pressuring Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. The road ahead for Israel is obviously perilous, and her leaders will require great skill, courage and good luck to traverse it successfully.

<sup>9</sup> *The Jerusalem Post*, October 11, 1971.

## BLACK SEPTEMBER

(Continued from page 8)

in a firefight between guerrillas and King Hussein's army. Probably the best known leader of the group, however, was Fuad Shemali, a Lebanese who planned some of the group's first operations before he died of cancer in August, 1972. Shemali was held in high esteem by Israeli intelligence and is believed to have left posthumous instructions to his followers which directed them to concentrate on a campaign of kidnapping notable Israelis such as scholars, scientists and athletes. Mohammed Yusuf Najjar, alias Abu Yusuf, who was once a top intelligence officer of Fatah, is believed to be Black September's new leader.

The Black September personnel probably received its tactical training in Jordan during the 1970's before King Hussein's crackdown. At this time the group probably established connections with other terrorist groups who also availed themselves of summer training sessions at commando bases in Jordan, where they attended lectures on such useful guerrilla skills as the care and handling of nitroglycerin and plastic explosives which are used to booby trap items such as letters and packages. Among the groups suspected of receiving training at Palestinian camps are the United States Weathermen, the Irish Republican Army, Turkey's Dev Genc group and possibly some members of Nicaragua's Tandanista guerrilla movement.

Additional evidence of an international exchange of ideas and pooling of weapons and information among terrorist groups emerges from an event which happened in May, 1972. At the time, three members of Japan's United Red Army Group, hired by the PFLP, took weapons out of suitcases and opened fire in the Tel Aviv airport, killing 26 persons and wounding 80. It is also interesting that the Black September terrorists at Munich demanded the release of the leaders of a group of German insurgents who had robbed at least eight banks, bombed American army posts and killed three German policemen.<sup>10</sup>

Black September's operations have been remarkably successful in causing the world community to focus its attention on the plight of the Arab refugee, but they have failed to shatter the resolve of the Israeli people whose defense forces will undoubtedly continue

their policy of armed retaliation. Therefore, a solution to the plight of the Arab refugee is imperative unless the international community is willing to live with a cycle of terrorism and counter-terror. Unfortunately, a quick solution which is acceptable to all the parties involved probably cannot be devised. Perhaps the only possible permanent solution will grow out of the evolutionary process of education and technological change that will eventually attract Palestinian young people to pursuits other than armed insurgency. Meanwhile, the Black September group and other terrorists must prepare themselves to face the inevitable specter of death, as the civilized world prepares to counter their tactics of terror. However, in a world of forged passports and international mobility, "it is simply impossible to prevent a man from going into the street with a machine gun and killing a lot of innocent bystanders if he is a fanatic and unconcerned about his own life."<sup>11</sup>

## IRAQ AND THE PERSIAN GULF REGION

(Continued from page 25)

ber of deputies in the Kuwaiti Assembly, argue that the nation should aspire to a much more activist leadership role in the Arab world. Demonstrating great concern for the "Arabism" of the Gulf,<sup>18</sup> they have adopted an openly anti-Iranian position, and have vowed to fight "Iranian imperialism" in various ways. Iranian occupation of the three Persian Gulf islands has had a traumatic impact on Kuwaiti politics, and as a result the "new school" of thought is, at least for the present, apparently dominating policy.

Shortly after the occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs, the Kuwaiti National Assembly urged the government to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and Iran. The Assembly also recommended that Kuwait use her oil wealth to pressure Britain into changing her "anti-Arab" policies. It described as "wise and decisive" Libya's nationalization of the British Petroleum Company. Although generally aligning the nation behind the Iraqi position, the Kuwaiti Cabinet did not go so far as to sever relations with Britain and Iran.

In May, 1972, talks were held between Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah Ahmad al-Jaber and his Iraqi counterpart, Murtada Hadithi al-Takriti. In a joint communiqué, there was a reaffirmation of the stand that the islands must be considered part of the Arab homeland.

Shortly before the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance and Oil pledged that his government would stand by the side of Iraq in the latter's struggle with the oil

<sup>10</sup> Information on the Black September group has been assembled from the following sources: "Terror at the Olympics," *Newsweek*, September 18, 1972, pp. 24-34; "Black September's Ruthless Few," *Time*, September 18, 1972, p. 33; "Arab Terrorism—Outraged World Seeks An Answer," *U. S. News and World Report*, September 18, 1972, pp. 16-18 and selected articles from *The New York Times* and *Christian Science Monitor* which appeared between September 7, 1972, and September 22, 1972.

<sup>11</sup> "Arab Terrorism—Outraged World Seeks An Answer," *U. S. News and World Report*, September 18, 1972, p. 17.

<sup>18</sup> Arabs refer to the Persian Gulf as the "Arab Gulf."



companies. He stated that foreign oil companies operating in Kuwait would not be allowed to increase production "at the expense of Iraq's legitimate rights."<sup>19</sup>

Notwithstanding these developments, Kuwait still feels that she has an independent role to play in the Gulf area. Unlike Iran, she is an Arab country, but not so leftist or so ambitious as Iraq. This, coupled with her great revenue from oil wealth, makes Kuwait an attractive source of aid for the traditionalistic U.A.E. For example, Kuwait has been extending aid to the United Arab Emirates for schools and hospitals, and the leaders of the federation have indicated that they would like this aid to continue.<sup>20</sup>

### A PATTERN OF ALIGNMENTS

Of all the Arab nations in the general region, the one most outspoken in its dedication to fomenting revolution in the traditionalist states of the area is the Republic of Southern Yemen. This nation has demonstrated its extremist orientation on many occasions. For example, when the General Assembly voted to admit the United Arab Emirates to the U.N., Southern Yemen voted against the admission of what it called a "fake" state.<sup>21</sup> When the Arab League decided to admit the U.A.E., the only opposition to the new member came from Southern Yemen, which had also opposed the membership of Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.

Typical of the stand taken by Southern Yemen was a statement made by Ali Nasser Mohammed, the Premier, on August 6, 1972. He said unequivocally that his country would continue to support revolution in the Arab (or Persian) Gulf, which is being led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf.

In January, 1972, it was announced that the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf and the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf had been united into the single front called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf. For about seven years the revolutionaries have been fighting loyalist Omanis and the British for control of Dhufar, the western part of Oman that shares a boundary with Southern Yemen.

The Baathist regime in Iraq has on many occasions given evidence of its political and material support for Southern Yemen. It can also be said that Baghdad is extending tangible support, directly and indirectly, to the revolutionary elements more openly embraced by Southern Yemen.

A breakthrough in the relations between two tradi-

tionalist states in the Arabian Peninsula occurred in December, 1971, when Sultan Qabus ben Said became the first ruler of Oman to visit neighboring Saudi Arabia. Shortly thereafter King Faisal announced that his country had extended full diplomatic recognition to Oman, thus ending an old feud.

In conclusion it might be suggested that a loose alignment exists, for regional purposes, among the nations of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Great Britain and the United States. Opposing this group is an alignment consisting of Iraq, Southern Yemen and, on the periphery, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

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## CONTINUING TROUBLE IN THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

(Continued from page 29)

of Cyprus, established in 1960, seemed unworkable, and efforts to amend it failed. The United States sought to help in achieving a solution, but came to the conclusion that direct negotiations provided the best procedure. The United States provided 40 per cent of the costs of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNICYP).<sup>9</sup> The low point in the alliance, no doubt, was reached in June, 1964, when President Lyndon B. Johnson called into question the American obligation under NATO, in the event that Turkey got into trouble with the U.S.S.R. while involved militarily with Greece over Cyprus.<sup>10</sup> The Cyprus problem, like that of Palestine, has proved intractable, largely because it has involved two nations with seemingly irreconcilable claims or rights on the island, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, supported by the Greek and Turkish governments. Nevertheless, by 1972, there were some indications of hope, if not precisely of solutions of problems. As Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General, reported in August, 1972, the complex problem of imported arms seemed settled through United Nations auspices, and inter-communal talks had been resumed. Although it was too early to assess possible progress, both the atmosphere and the substance showed some promise.<sup>11</sup>

The Cyprus problem was a basic factor in the development of anti-Americanism in Turkey, since it led some Turks to believe that the United States was not really interested in their country, only using Turkey in

<sup>9</sup> See Department of State, *GIST, CYPRUS*, No. 35 (January, 1972); Department of State, Republic of Cyprus: Background Notes (1970).

<sup>10</sup> For texts of the Johnson-Inönü exchange of June 5, 13, 1964, see *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer, 1966), pp. 386-393. See also Harris, Ch. 5.

<sup>11</sup> U. N. Doc. A/8701/Add. 1, p. 7. See also *United States Foreign Policy 1971: A Report by the Secretary of State* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1972), pp. 108-109.

<sup>19</sup> *Baghdad Observer*, May 24, 1972, p. 4.

<sup>20</sup> *Kuwait Times*, July 27, 1972, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> The vote was 93 in favor of admitting the U.A.E. and one against, with no abstentions.



its own interest. Other elements were the presence of a large American force in the country, the alleged activities of the C.I.A. and its interference in Turkey's internal affairs, and the rise of radicalism among segments of Turkey's university students and labor movement. By 1968, American military personnel and their dependents numbered no less than 24,000, although by 1970 their numbers were reduced to 16,000. By 1971-1972 their numbers were further reduced and their privileges became less obvious. Outside general headquarters in Ankara and the regional NATO headquarters in Izmir, American military personnel in numbers were in evidence only in Karamürsel (near Izmit), Sinop (Black Sea), at Diyarbakir (southeastern Turkey), and at the Incirlik air base (near Adana). Moreover, in 1968, a new agreement on cooperation modified the status of forces agreement and made the complex situation of American troops seem somewhat less like the well-remembered, much hated Ottoman capitulatory regime, which had enshrined extraterritorial rights. Nevertheless, so serious had the situation become that visits of the United States Sixth Fleet to Istanbul and other major Turkish ports were curtailed because of the demonstrations and riots which they stimulated.

As already observed, American assistance to Turkey since 1946 had amounted to more than \$5,000,000,000, and assistance had come to symbolize both American interest and "interference" in Turkey and therefore to create problems. In more recent years, however, the American-Turkish relationship has been deeply troubled by the Turkish production of opium poppies, a major source of the drug traffic in the United States. Turkey was one of seven countries authorized under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to produce the opium poppy (with India, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Iran, Yugoslavia and Greece).<sup>12</sup> In June, 1971, Turkey announced a total ban on the centuries-old cultivation of the opium poppy, in support of the international effort to curb the illicit traffic, to take effect after the harvest in June-July, 1972. The United States exerted much pressure on the Turkish government and agreed to provide \$35,000,-

000 over a three- to four-year period to offset losses in foreign exchange and to assist in financing development projects in the opium-growing areas, with \$20,000,000 to go to programs to develop new sources of income for farmers, and the remainder to be used at the rate of \$5,000,000 per year for three years to replace foreign exchange losses. The success of the control programs remains to be seen. Meanwhile, there have been misunderstandings and irritation.

On the other hand, after a long delay, the United States agreed to sell Turkey 40 Phantom F-4 jets on August 10, 1972. To maintain her balance, especially in the Cyprus danger zone, Turkey was believed to have sought 60 Phantoms. Prime Minister Erim had come to the United States during March 20-24 to seek military aid, which had fallen from \$115,000,000 per year during 1965-1970 to \$60,000,000 in 1971. Under the new arrangement, the United States was to supply two squadrons with four in reserve, matching the Greek air force. The cost was some \$167,000,000, repayable in ten years, at five per cent, with deliveries to begin in 1973 and to be completed in 1976, with pilots trained in the United States.

Meanwhile, during the visit of President Nikolai V. Podgorny to Turkey during April 11-18, the Turkish government and the U.S.S.R. mutually pledged to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and not to permit their territories to be used for aggressive purposes. Since NATO was a defensive alliance, however, NATO bases were not included in the prohibition. There was also some discussion of economic problems; it may be observed that over the years, the U.S.S.R. has provided Turkey with some \$363,000,000 in economic assistance for developing basic industries. With 50 per cent of Soviet overseas commerce passing through the Turkish Straits in the Mediterranean and the growing Soviet naval interest in that area, to say nothing of the enduring Soviet interest in the Middle East, Soviet-Turkish relations assume added significance.<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, Turkey's basic ties are likely to remain with the West, regardless of the ups and downs of Turkish politics. The turmoil continued toward the end of the year, but there were indications that realism and good sense would prevail.<sup>14</sup>

## EGYPT AND THE PALESTINIANS

(Continued from page 12)

in order to expand the economic infrastructure that will give a base for a deep-rooted Jewish presence and will serve as a lever in our struggle over the future map of Israel in the political arena.

It may, therefore, be concluded that, given the present deadlock of peace efforts in the Middle East, post-Nasser's Egypt may become progressively more closely identified with the political and military aims of the Palestinian National Movement.

<sup>12</sup> U. S. Department of State, GIST, TURKEY: BAN ON OPIUM POPPY-GROWING. No. 80 (August, 1972).

<sup>13</sup> See especially Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1971), Ch. 5; Ferenc A. Vali, *The Turkish Straits and NATO* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1972), 348 pp.; Harry N. Howard, "The Turkish Straits after World War II: Problems and Prospects," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1970), 35-60; Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Soviet Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1971), 49 pp.; Wynfred Joshua, *Soviet Penetration into the Middle East* (New York: NSIC, 1971), 57 pp.; Norman Polmar, *Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 1970s* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1972), 71 pp.

<sup>14</sup> See Sevinc Carlson, "Turkey's Fragile Democracy: The Danger That Lies Ahead," *New Middle East*, No. 44 (May, 1972), 15-18.

## EGYPT AND THE SOVIET EXODUS

(Continued from page 35)

a move could be seriously contemplated on a major scale as long as Sadat remained in power.

Sidky's trip encountered opposition on the part of those higher army officers who had initially pressed the President to remove the Russians. A day after Sidky's report on his mission to a joint session of the Central Committee of the ASU and the People's Council (Parliament), on October 26, General Ahmed Sadek was removed from his position as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense and replaced by General Ahmed Ismail. Similarly, a change was made in the top command of the Egyptian navy. There followed a wave of speculation as to whether Sadat had been threatened with a coup d'état by the anti-Soviet hard-liners in the military establishment. Strong denials of any coup attempt were issued by the government.

By removing the Soviet advisers, President Sadat had thus responded to a variety of pressures and inducements in addition to his own thoughts and emotions. Although Egypt was weakened militarily as an immediate result, she regained greater freedom of action in her foreign policy. The effect that this momentous decision would have, in the long run, on Sadat's position as chief power-holder in Egypt remained to be assessed.

## NORTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 32)

The latter perspective should be underscored. Despite the innumerable rivalries that affect the Mediterranean states, their leaders insist with mounting urgency that they have a seminal role to play in the reordering of power and influence in the region. "Consociation" is their *leitmotif*, with an emphasis on the legitimation of the interests of the states that have refused to align themselves with East and West in the erstwhile struggle for paramount position.

### THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

In one vital area, the balance of decision already has shifted to the North African littoral states. Increasingly, the United States and West Europe are dependent on the Middle East for raw materials, particularly energy resources. If the United States had to rely entirely upon domestic reserves for oil, it would deplete these in a very few years and still face critical shortages in the process. This is because the population of the United States has doubled in the last 50 years, while energy use has grown almost four times. European consumption has grown at roughly a comparable rate. Thus, there appears to be no way to

meet Western energy needs without looking to the troubled Middle East and North Africa.

The importance of this development has great potential significance for the decades ahead. In the nineteenth century, the strength of the United States and West Europe was predicated on an abundance of raw materials. In essence, we were "have" nations capable of commanding the raw material resources of the poor, benighted peoples of the non-developed world. By the seventh decade of the twentieth century, we are in the position of "have not" nations, looking elsewhere to fill our needs. We have yet to take full cognizance of the fact that, for the remainder of this century at least, our economic well-being will depend upon our ability to meet requirements by achieving an accommodation with such nations as Algeria and Libya in North Africa.

### OIL AND POLITICS

The politics of oil is particularly illuminating in this regard. Over the past three years, Libya has confronted American producer companies with demands for expanded oil exploration programs requiring millions of dollars in additional investments. In addition, the Revolutionary Command Council has gained ascendancy by cutting back production of selected company concessions, assuming majority holding rights, and "nationalizing" certain other investment portfolios.

Algeria has followed a similar course. She has offered French companies partnership status (49 per cent), which has meant Algerian control over operations, production and investment. For those companies which have been "nationalized," a modest level of compensation as well as negotiated adjustments in tax arrearages have been proffered. Moreover, in an effort to diversify her foreign consumer market situation, Algeria has actively solicited sales arrangements with other West European and Warsaw Pact nations. Finally, the government of Algeria has completed negotiations leading to a substantial increase in the price of crude oil, slightly less than three dollars per barrel.

These alterations in the terms of trade and of partnership clearly signal the mounting dependency of energy consumer nations like France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. However, rather than serving as a cause for alarm, such dependence should help to place interregional relationships on a firmer, more constructive footing. For, in exchange for North African petroleum and natural gas, the United States and other Western nations will provide their technology, manufacturing and processing skills, and planning know-how. Clearly, this would be a fair exchange, one which could also put an end to the quaint conceits of the past. In mutual dependence lies the true hope for mutual respect.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of November, 1972, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Berlin

Nov. 5—The Big Four powers—the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union—in their 9th meeting since October 23, agree on a formula reaffirming Four-Power rights and responsibilities for the two Germanies. The Western allies will continue to maintain military patrols in East Berlin and use East German roads for access to Berlin.

### Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea

Nov. 13—After 14 days of discussion, representatives of 91 countries, meeting in London, agree on a global convention which will prohibit the dumping of poisonous waste materials at sea.

### Disarmament

Nov. 21—The United States and the U.S.S.R. begin another round of SALT talks in Geneva.

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

Nov. 1—The countries of the European Economic Community agree on a complicated protectionist device to aid their fruit and vegetable growers without adversely affecting the American citrus growers who ship to the EEC countries.

### European Security Conference

Nov. 23—A 34-member preparatory conference to plan a European security conference in 1973 opens in Helsinki, Finland.

Nov. 29—In Helsinki, the chief Soviet delegate urges that the European security conference should open its meeting in June, 1973.

### General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Nov. 10—A ministerial-level meeting of the member nations of GATT takes place in Geneva. William D. Eberle, U.S. President Richard Nixon's special representative, proposes a timetable for negotiations scheduled to begin in 1973.

### Middle East Crisis

(See also *Israel, Jordan*)

Nov. 1—According to reliable reports from Beirut, Lebanon, the U.S.S.R. will restore SAM-6 mobile

were removed upon the ouster of Soviet advisers from Cairo in July, 1972.

Nov. 9—In retaliation for guerrilla raids against Israeli-occupied Golan Heights positions, Israeli jets make 2 strikes into Syria.

Nov. 10—At least 18 letter bombs presumably sent by the Arab Black September group are intercepted in London and in Geneva. The letters are addressed to Jewish companies, organizations and individuals and were mailed from India.

Nov. 14—Western diplomatic sources say that the Munich Olympic Village attack by members of the Black September group aimed to foil a plan for secret Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan confers in Washington with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers.

Nov. 15—The 12 members of the Arab League and a Palestinian Liberation delegation open a meeting in Kuwait in an attempt to plan collective Arab action against Israel and to deal with Jordan's severed relations with Egypt and Syria.

Nov. 21—Military spokesmen in Tel Aviv report 8 hours of heavy fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces, involving air, artillery and tank battles. This is the biggest battle along the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line in 2 years.

Nov. 25—Military sources in Damascus and Tel Aviv report the shelling of 2 Israeli positions in the Golan Heights by Syrian gunners.

Nov. 27—In an interview with the Beirut newspaper *An Nahar*, King Hussein of Jordan confirms reports of an abortive coup, organized by Libya's leader, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, Palestinian guerrilla leader Yasir Arafat and other Palestinians, designed to overthrow him.

### United Nations

Nov. 2—The U.N. General Assembly's Economic and Financial Committee approves plans for carrying out the recommendations of the United Nations environmental conference held in Stockholm in June, 1972.

Nov. 3—Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cisse of Guinea becomes the first woman president of the U.N. Security Council. The post is rotated among the 15 members of the council.

Nov. 4—The General Assembly approves a recommendation condemning colonialism and recognizing

- Nov. 10—The U.N.'s Economic Committee votes to locate the headquarters of the U.N. Environmental Program in Nairobi, Kenya.
- Nov. 16—By a vote of 100 to 1, with 15 abstentions, the Political Committee of the General Assembly deplores the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons.
- Nov. 24—East Germany is granted permanent observer status at the U.N.
- Nov. 25—After a 4-week disarmament debate, 111 countries of the General Assembly's Political Committee vote to examine possibilities for a world disarmament conference. The U.S. abstains from voting.
- Nov. 29—In a compromise, the General Assembly approves a resolution approving membership in the United Nations for Bangladesh and another resolution urging the release of Pakistani prisoners captured in Bangladesh.

## War in Indochina

(See also *Thailand; U.S., Military*)

### MILITARY RECORD

- Nov. 3—North Vietnamese troops aided by tanks overrun the Central Highlands post of Ducco, 12 miles from the Cambodian border of South Vietnam.
- The Pentagon announces that South Korea, Taiwan and Iran have agreed to supply South Vietnam with F-5A fighters they had previously obtained from the U.S.
- Nov. 4—More than 100 B-52's strike at North Vietnamese positions in North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos.
- Nov. 5—It is reported that B-52's dropped nearly 2.5 million pounds of bombs over South Vietnam and southern North Vietnam in the last 24 hours.
- The South Vietnamese command reports heavy attacks by North Vietnamese forces in the Central Highlands between Pleiku and Kontum.
- Nov. 6—The U.S. command reports that 1,500 American troops were withdrawn from South Vietnam last week. 32,000 U.S. servicemen remain in the country.
- Nov. 7—Quangtri Province is the target for a record saturation bombing attack by U.S. B-52's.
- Nov. 8—More than 2,000 tons of bombs are dropped by U.S. B-52's in the area between Quang-tri and the middle of the North Vietnamese panhandle.
- Nov. 11—The 50-square-mile Longbinh headquarters base is turned over to the South Vietnamese army by the U.S. command.

According to reports from Pnompenh, Cambodia, 20 Skyraider bombers have been turned over to Cambodia to increase her effective fighting capability.

- Nov. 13—The U.S. command reports heavy B-52 and

fighter-bomber strikes on the southern portion of North Vietnam.

The Laotian command reports a North Vietnamese rocket attack on the airport of the royal Laotian capital of Luang Prabang; 51 rockets are reportedly fired by the enemy.

- Nov. 14—The U.S. command reports more than 300 strikes by American fighter-bombers on the North Vietnamese southern panhandle; B-52's also fly 11 missions.
- Nov. 15—U.S. fighter-bombers fly 270 strikes in North Vietnam below the 20th parallel in an effort to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines.
- Nov. 22—U.S. military sources report the first loss of a B-52 bomber to enemy gunfire in the war. U.S. B-52's fly their heaviest raids of the war over North Vietnam.
- Nov. 23—Southern North Vietnam is again heavily bombed by U.S. B-52's striking at supply accumulations.
- Nov. 25—U.S. B-52's fly 14 missions against North Vietnam, maintaining an increased bombing level that began with the resumption of peace talks in Paris on November 20.
- Nov. 27—The U.S. command announces the withdrawal of 1,300 U.S. servicemen from Vietnam, reducing American troop strength to 28,000. U.S. President Richard Nixon's goal was to reduce strength there to 27,000 by December 1.
- Nov. 30—White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler declares that no more public announcements will be made about troop withdrawals from Vietnam.

### PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

- Nov. 4—Xuan Thuy, leader of North Vietnam's delegation to the Paris peace talks, says North Vietnam is willing to join in another round of negotiations, if the U.S. is "serious."
- Nov. 8—The White House announces that General Alexander Haig, Jr., U.S. national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger's chief aide, is flying to Saigon to confer with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu on peace negotiations in Indochina.
- Nov. 12—General Alexander Haig, Jr., meets Cambodian President Lon Nol in Pnompenh.
- Saigon sources report that President Thieu is willing to agree to the draft North Vietnamese-United States peace settlement if North Vietnam will pledge "in principle" to withdraw North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam.
- Nov. 14—Henry A. Kissinger confers with President Nixon in Washington in preparation for his return to Paris for talks with North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho.
- Nov. 21—The 6th weekly peace negotiating session between the Laotian government and the Communist-led Pathet Lao ends; no progress is reported.



Nov. 25—After 6 days of negotiation, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho end their negotiations on a cease-fire in Vietnam and announce that they will resume their talks on Monday, December 4.

Nov. 28—The Laotian government-Pathet Lao peace negotiations end another session with no report of progress.

## ARGENTINA

Nov. 17—Following a 17-year-exile, Juan D. Perón, who served as President for 9 years (1946–1955), returns with his wife and staff, at the invitation of the military government, which plans to restore democratic government in 1973.

Nov. 21—Perón addresses Argentine civilian political leaders on reaching a basic agreement for the return to civilian rule.

Nov. 22—President Alejandro A. Lanusse, at a news conference, asserts that Perón's return will be a "positive contribution" to restoring civilian government.

## BELGIUM

Nov. 22—Premier Gaston Eyskens announces to Parliament that he is resigning because of insoluble differences between the Flemish- and French-speaking population.

## BOLIVIA

Nov. 23—President Hugo Banzer Suarez imposes a state of siege after factory workers in La Paz schedule a 24-hour, anti-government strike to start at midnight.

Nov. 24—In the northern textile district of La Paz, striking workers barricade themselves in their factories.

Nov. 25—A 2-day strike ends; the state of siege remains in effect.

## CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Nov. 5—It is reported that last night President Lon Nol offered total amnesty to the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian rebel troops who fight on the side of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong.

Nov. 17—According to the Cambodian military command, Cambodian troops have retaken control of the highway from Kompong Som (Cambodia's only seaport) to Phnompenh.

## CANADA

Nov. 2—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, at a televised news conference, announces that he will not resign. He plans to remain in office until Parliament convenes in January, 1973, so that his Liberal party minority government can face a vote of confidence. It is reported that the Liberals are counting on the support of the 31 seats held by the

majority. The Liberals, who won only 108 of the 264 seats in Parliament in the election of October 30, thus reject the demand of Progressive Conservative party leader Robert L. Stanfield that Trudeau resign. The Progressive Conservatives control 108 parliamentary seats.

Nov. 27—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announces that as a result of the October 30 election he has made 18 changes in his Cabinet; he has added eight newcomers.

## CHAD

Nov. 28—President François Tombalbaye announces that the Republic of Chad will end diplomatic relations with Israel. At the same time he announces that Chad will recognize the People's Republic of China.

## CHILE

Nov. 3—It is reported that last night President Salvador Allende Gossens appointed 3 military leaders to a new Cabinet to help settle the 23-day-old strike.

Nov. 5—The Interior Minister, General Carlos Prats, and strike leaders reach agreement on ending the work stoppages. On October 11, 50,000 truck owners and drivers struck to protest a government plan to create a state-run transport authority in southern Chile. They were soon joined by middle class professionals and businessmen. For over 3 weeks a modified form of martial law has been imposed.

## CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Nov. 3—In Lagos, Chinese and Nigerian officials sign two agreements for increased trade and economic cooperation.

Nov. 26—An agreement is signed in Peking to provide Chinese economic and military aid for North Vietnam in 1973.

## CUBA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 21—The U.S. State Department announces that Cuba will try the 3 hijackers who earlier this month commandeered a Southern Airways jet and forced it to land in Havana after receiving \$2 million in ransom.

## EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

## GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *Intl, Berlin*)

Nov. 1—Following the amnesty announced last month, East Germany releases the first group of criminal

the period from November 1, 1972, to January 31, 1973.

Nov. 3—East German sources disclose that over 7,300 prisoners have been released so far in the amnesty that will eventually free some 30,000 persons.

Nov. 22—First Secretary of the East German Communist party Erich Honecker, in an interview, foresees improved relations with West Germany. He warns the West German government not to interfere in East Germany's internal affairs, and declares it is to the world's advantage to have two Germanies.

## GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl, Berlin*)

Nov. 8—A draft treaty designed to begin normalizing relations between the two Germanies is initialed by representatives of the two countries. The treaty will open the way for admission of the two countries into the United Nations. It provides for cooperation between the states but falls short of full diplomatic ties. Ratification will take place after the West German elections, and the formation of a new West German Parliament.

Nov. 18—It is announced that West Germany recently agreed to pay \$31 million in compensation to about 6,000 Poles who were used for medical experiments in Nazi concentration camps during World War II.

Nov. 19—In federal elections, the West German coalition government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats receives 54 per cent of the total vote. The Social Democratic party itself, led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, won 45.9 per cent of the vote. The opposition Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian branch, the Christian Social Union, won 44.8 per cent; for the first time since the Federal Republic was established in 1949, the C.D.U. received fewer votes than the S.D.P.

Nov. 25—A West German police marksman kills a hijacker who commandeered an Air Canada plane at Frankfurt's airport and held a stewardess hostage for 24 hours.

## GREECE

Nov. 20—Greek university students are allowed to vote for student organization leaders for the first time since the 1967 military coup.

## INDIA

(See also *Pakistan*)

Nov. 18—An official Pakistani announcement declares that Indian and Pakistani military authorities have agreed to try to curb violations along their cease-fire line.

Nov. 23—Indian army troops are sent to Andhra Pradesh in southern India to help police quell violence.

## INDONESIA

Nov. 25—Concluding his European tour, President Suharto meets with Pope Paul VI at the Vatican.

## IRELAND

(See also *United Kingdom, Northern Ireland*)

Nov. 27—A major increase in security is ordered as Prime Minister John Lynch seeks additional authority to curb the terrorism of the illegal Irish Republican Army.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Nov. 13—Defense Minister Moshe Dayan arrives in the U.S. for talks with top officials; he is reportedly seeking American assurance that deliveries of fighter planes will continue and authority to make new military purchases.

## ITALY

Nov. 22—*The New York Times* reports that some 3 million workers are on strike as labor unrest peaks.

Nov. 28—Final returns in the municipal elections of November 26-27 show gains for the moderate Socialists and Social Democrats and losses for the Communists and neo-Fascists.

## JAPAN

Nov. 13—The Japanese Diet approves 2 trade bills and a large supplementary budget designed to reduce Japan's increasing trade surplus.

Premier Kakuei Tanaka acts to dissolve the House of Representatives, the powerful lower house of Parliament. A new election is scheduled for December 10.

## JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Nov. 25—Jordanian sources in Lebanon report that an attempted coup planned for November 7 against King Hussein of Jordan was thwarted early in the month.

Nov. 26—*An Nahar*, a Lebanese newspaper, reports that King Hussein was treated in a hospital for a wound on his thigh following an assassination attempt on November 18.

## KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Nov. 4—It is reported that in Pyongyang, North and South Korean officials have signed agreements that would help promote eventual peaceful unification. The agreements provide for political and economic exchanges and a halt to propaganda leaflets and broadcasts.

## KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

- Nov. 21—In a referendum on constitutional revisions, South Koreans ratify the amendments giving strong powers to President Park Chung Hee for an unlimited length of time.
- Nov. 25—A presidential decree forbids all professional politicians to run for election to the 2,359-member electoral college that will approve a new 6-year term for President Park.
- Nov. 28—81 universities and colleges, closed by government order since October 17, are allowed to re-open.

## LAOS

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

- Nov. 10—Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Premier, confers with Phoumi Vongvichit, the leader of the Pathet Lao delegation to the Laotian peace talks.
- Nov. 22—In an interview, Prince Souvanna Phouma declares that he has a commitment from the U.S. to continue bombing in Laos if Laos is not included in the anticipated Vietnam peace settlement.

## LEBANON

- Nov. 11—It is reported that police, firing on striking workers in a Beirut suburb, have killed 2 and wounded 18 persons.
- Nov. 12—The Cabinet orders the army to maintain order during a leftist demonstration tomorrow to protest the killing of 2 strikers.
- Nov. 13—Some 5,000 people demonstrate in Beirut.
- Nov. 14—Some 100,000 workers and 50,000 students participate in a 24-hour strike.

## MOROCCO

- Nov. 3—King Hassan II names Ahmed Osman, his brother-in-law, to be the new Premier; he succeeds Mohammed Karim Lamrani.
- Nov. 7—A military tribunal sentences 11 Air Force members to death for their role in an assassination attempt on King Hassan's life in August, 1972.

## NETHERLANDS, THE

- Nov. 29—The Catholic People's party loses 7 of its 35 seats in the 150-seat lower House of Parliament in today's general election. The party is the largest group in the government's minority coalition. The Liberal party, another member of the coalition, gains 6 seats, and the 3 left-of-center members of the coalition gain a total of 4 seats.

## NEW ZEALAND

- Nov. 26—A surprise victory in yesterday's general election has swept the Labor party into office. The defeated National party, in power for 12 years, won 32 of the 87 parliamentary seats. Labor party leader Norman E. Kirk is expected to become Prime

## PAKISTAN

(See also *India*)

- Nov. 8—A government announcement states that Pakistan has withdrawn today from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
- Nov. 27—President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tells all 617 Indian prisoners of war that they are free "from this moment"; he expresses hope that India will reciprocate by freeing more than 84,000 Pakistani prisoners of war captured in December, 1971.

## POLAND

- Nov. 13—Communist party leader Edward Gierek addresses a trade union congress; he urges workers to increase their productivity or forfeit their improved standard of living.

## PORTUGAL

- Nov. 14—Premier Marcello Caetano asserts that his government will not negotiate with rebels in Portugal's African territories.

The U.N. General Assembly, voting 98 to 6, condemns Portugal for the fighting in her African possessions.

- Nov. 23—The Portuguese government issues a statement rejecting a U.N. Security Council resolution that urged an end to fighting in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea.

## SPAIN

- Nov. 2—The French consulate at Saragossa is bombed; the attack is thought to be the work of Basque separatists.

## THAILAND

- Nov. 24—*The New York Times* reports that Thailand and the U.S. have agreed to maintain a "significant American military presence," including air power, in Thailand, following a Vietnam peace settlement.

## TURKEY

- Nov. 4—The Republican People's party (a left-wing group) withdraws its 5 cabinet ministers from the right-wing coalition government of Premier Ferit Melen.

## UGANDA

- Nov. 7—The U.N. sets up departure centers for stateless Asians who have been expelled from Uganda by order of President Idi Amin.
- Nov. 8—President Amin's 90-day deadline for the departure of Asian non-citizens from Uganda expires.
- Nov. 9—The last remaining stateless Asians registered with the U.N. are flown out.

## U.S.S.R.

- Nov. 6—It is reported that in a speech on September

Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin called for efficiency and economy in the industrial sector to offset the strain created by the \$2-billion worth of grain purchased because of crop failures this year.

Nov. 7—Soviet leaders review the annual Revolution Day parade, in celebration of the 55th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. It is reported that Communist party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev does not look well.

Nov. 16—The chairman of Pepsico, Inc., Donald M. Kendall, announces that an agreement has been reached with the Soviet Ministry of Trade to manufacture and sell Pepsi-Cola in the Soviet Union.

Nov. 18—It is reported that in September, 1972, Andrei D. Sakharov, a Soviet physicist, and some 50 others petitioned the Supreme Soviet to release political prisoners.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Great Britain

Nov. 2—Prime Minister Edward Heath, after conferring with business and labor leaders for 7 hours, voices regret that the union leaders will not participate in a voluntary anti-inflation program.

Nov. 5—Prime Minister Heath announces 19 ministerial changes, including 4 Cabinet portfolios. A new ministry for trade and consumer affairs is established, under Sir Geoffrey Howe's leadership.

Nov. 6—Addressing the House of Commons, Prime Minister Heath announces a mandatory, 90-day freeze on wages, prices, rents and dividends. The freeze becomes effective today; however, the bill introduced today with its retroactive provision must be approved by Parliament.

Nov. 22—By a vote of 275 to 240, the House of Commons defeats a bill to implement an immigration act passed earlier this year. Within 40 days Prime Minister Heath must present modifications of the bill, which would allow citizens of Common Market countries to seek work freely in Great Britain. The bill would fulfill some of Britain's obligations as a Common Market member, a status she attains January 1, 1973.

Nov. 30—Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Foreign Secretary, tells the House of Commons that British technical aid to Uganda will be phased out and a \$24-million credit to Uganda will be canceled because of Uganda's expulsion of her Asian population.

### Northern Ireland

(See also *Ireland*)

Nov. 9—Members of the Irish Republican Army and British troops engage in street fighting in Belfast.

Nov. 16—British Prime Minister Heath, on a visit to Northern Ireland, warns Protestants against unilaterally announcing Northern Ireland's independence.

Nov. 19—Sean MacStiofain, chief of staff of the militant Provisional wing of the I.R.A., is arrested.

Nov. 20—Some 600 demonstrators assemble in Dublin to protest the detention of Sean MacStiofain.

Nov. 23—Officials of the Irish government disclose that the government will act to curb the I.R.A.

Nov. 24—The trial of Sean MacStiofain opens. He is charged with membership in an illegal organization.

Nov. 25—MacStiofain is sentenced to 6 months in prison.

Nov. 26—8 followers of Sean MacStiofain attempt unsuccessfully to abduct him from a Dublin hospital where he remains weak because of his week-long fast, but conscious.

In Dublin, 3,000 marchers demanding MacStiofain's release parade with police escort.

Nov. 28—Four people are killed as terrorists stage the first coordinated rocket attacks on 10 targets in Northern Ireland.

## UNITED STATES

### Civil Rights

(See also *Supreme Court*)

Nov. 1—Because of student seizure of the administration building, Southern University in New Orleans, the nation's largest black university, is closed. The university's Baton Rouge campus was closed October 31 because of a student attempt to force the university's president from his office. Violence also breaks out at Grambling State College in Grambling, Louisiana.

Nov. 7—Presidential advisers meet with representatives of the 500 Indians who seized the Bureau of Indian Affairs building November 2 to protest the way Indians are treated by the federal bureaucracy.

Nov. 8—The protesting Indians leave the Bureau of Indian Affairs building. Looting and damage to the building are estimated at one million dollars.

Nov. 16—Two black students are killed as police clash with demonstrators at Southern University's Baton Rouge campus. Louisiana Governor Edwin W. Edwards closes the campus and declares a state of emergency.

A U.S. district court rules that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has illegally refused to stop federal aid to "many state and local educational agencies" that have failed to desegregate schools.

Complying with a court-ordered timetable, the Massachusetts Board of Education adopts a plan to reduce racial imbalance in the Boston schools.

William T. Farr, a reporter for *The Los Angeles Times*, is jailed for an indefinite term because he has refused to disclose his sources for a 1970 news story on the Charles Manson murder case.

Nov. 17—White House press secretary Ronald L.



Ziegler says that the administration asked for the resignation of the Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh as chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Yesterday, Ziegler said that the resignation had been initiated by Father Hesburgh.

Nov. 21—Federal District Judge W. Arthur Garrity orders Harvard Professor Samuel L. Popkin to begin serving a prison sentence imposed last May for contempt of a federal grand jury. Popkin, a former colleague of Daniel Ellsberg, refused to answer certain questions put to him by a grand jury investigating the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers. (See *Current History*, August, 1971, p. 127.)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reverses the convictions (February, 1969) of 5 defendants in the Chicago Seven conspiracy case, partly because of what it terms the "antagonistic" courtroom behavior of Judge Julius J. Hoffman.

Nov. 28—Samuel L. Popkin is freed from jail when the federal government dismisses the grand jury investigating the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers.

Nov. 29—Father Philip F. Berrigan is paroled after serving 38 months in federal prison for illegal anti-war activities.

## Economy

Nov. 3—The Labor Department reports that the unemployment rate remains 5.5 per cent of the labor force; 82.7 million persons are reported to be at work as of October, 1972.

Nov. 14—The Dow-Jones industrial stock average closes at 1,003.16, the first time it has ever closed above 1,000.

## Elections

Nov. 7—President Richard Nixon is reelected. 60.83 per cent of the popular vote, and 521 electoral votes give him a landslide victory; Democratic candidate George McGovern wins only in the state of Massachusetts and the District of Columbia.

In the Senate, the Democrats increase their majority by two votes; they will have a 57-43 lead in the 93rd Congress.

In the House, the Republicans win a net gain of 13 seats. According to unofficial returns, in the 93d Congress, there will be 242 Democrats, one independent, and 192 Republicans in the House of Representatives.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Nov. 4—President Nixon admits "there are some details still to be negotiated" before a truce can be arranged in Vietnam but says agreement on three major principles has been reached.

Nov. 8—Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson and Polish Trade Minister Tadeusz Olechowski sign

a series of agreements to enlarge trade between the U.S. and Poland over the next several years. Credits for Poland from the Export-Import Bank are authorized by President Nixon.

Nov. 16—The State Department announces that the U.S. and some of its European allies have asked the Soviet Union and some of its allies to begin talks on January 31 on reducing military forces in central Europe.

Nov. 22—The President lifts a 22-year U.S. ban on travel to China of U.S. ships and planes.

Nov. 27—The State Department reveals that the Swiss Ambassador, representing the U.S., began negotiations with Cuba in Havana November 25 to try to stop hijacking of airplanes to Cuba.

Presidential national security adviser Henry Kissinger meets with the President twice and with Secretary of State William P. Rogers once to discuss a cease-fire in Vietnam.

## Government

Nov. 9—In an interview with the *Washington Star-Times*, released today, President Nixon pledges that he will try to put an end to "the whole era of permissiveness." Declaring that "the average American is just like the child in the family," the President says that if you pamper him too much "you are going to make him soft, spoiled, and eventually a very weak individual."

Nov. 24—The search for Representative Hale Boggs (D., La.) and 3 others missing since October 16 on a flight from Anchorage to Juneau, Alaska, is officially suspended.

The Federal Trade Commission charges that the Aluminum Company of America, the Kennecott Copper Corporation and the Armco Steel Corporation are in violation of the law banning interlocking directorates of large competing companies.

Nov. 27—President Nixon says he views his reelection mandate as a demonstration that the nation wants "change that works, not radical change, not destructive change, but change that builds. . . ."

The President announces that he has accepted the resignations of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and of Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney.

Nov. 28—The President names Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot L. Richardson as Secretary of Defense. Casper W. Weinberger, director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, is named to succeed Richardson at HEW. Roy L. Ash, president of Litton Industries, is named to succeed Weinberger.

William D. Ruckelshaus, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, discloses that the President has ordered the EPA to distribute to the states only \$2 billion of the \$5 billion author-

ized by Congress in fiscal 1973 for sewage treatment plants; he has ordered that only \$3 billion of the \$6 billion authorized for fiscal 1974 be allotted. Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorizing the funds over the President's veto October 18.

Nov. 29—The President names Peter J. Brennan, president of the Building and Construction Trades Council in New York City and New York State, as Secretary of Labor, succeeding James D. Hodgson.

Nov. 30—The President announced that Secretary of State William P. Rogers will remain in his post. Kenneth Rush, William J. Porter and William J. Casey are named as sub-Cabinet officers in the State Department.

### Military

Nov. 8—130 crewmen, 129 of them black, temporarily refuse to obey an order to return to their ship, the aircraft carrier *Constellation*, as part of a continuing protest against alleged racism on shipboard.

Nov. 10—Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, reprimands senior commanders for ignoring his directives on race relations. He warns that recent incidents on the *Constellation*, the *Kitty Hawk* and the *Hassayampa* "are clearly due to failure of commands to implement" racial reform programs "with a whole heart."

Nov. 14—Zumwalt warns young enlisted men that he will not sacrifice strict discipline for liberalized reforms.

Nov. 20—A Department of Defense spokesman says that an urgent program to arm South Vietnam before the withdrawal of American forces has been virtually completed.

Nov. 25—*The New York Times* reports from Saigon that the U.S. is planning a major U.S. civilian presence in South Vietnam after a cease-fire; it is reported that some 10,000, most of them under government contract, will remain.

Nov. 28—Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, says that fewer than 10,000 men will be drafted in the first half of 1973; the draft authority expires July 1.

### Politics

Nov. 1—Bernard L. Barker, a defendant in the case involving the June, 1971, break-in at the Democratic party's Watergate headquarters in Washington, D.C., is found guilty of falsely notarizing a signature on a \$25,000 check that was forwarded to the Finance Committee to Reelect the President.

Nov. 2—The names of formerly secret donors of more than \$1,000 to the Republican party's campaign fund are disclosed; the donors made their contributions before the new law making disclosure of their names mandatory went into effect.

Nov. 9—Jean Westwood, the Democratic National

Chairman, announces that she intends to keep her post, despite efforts to replace her by Democrats opposed to South Dakota's Senator George McGovern, defeated Democratic candidate for the presidency.

Nov. 26—Alabama's Governor George C. Wallace says that he will be physically able to run for the presidency in 1976 but has not yet decided whether to become a candidate.

### Supreme Court

(See also *Civil Rights*)

Nov. 6—The Supreme Court agrees to hear a case involving the constitutionality of a New York state law reimbursing church-related schools for costs of pupil-testing and record-keeping.

The Court upholds a 3-judge federal panel ruling of June 22 that held a law prohibiting large-scale demonstrations on the Capitol grounds unconstitutional.

Nov. 10—The Court refuses to delay the execution of a contempt conviction against Harvard University scholar Samuel L. Popkin, who refused to answer grand jury questions about the Pentagon Papers and has been sentenced to jail for contempt (see also *Civil Rights*).

Nov. 13—The Supreme Court refuses to hear an appeal by Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo of the trial judge's refusal to let the defendants see a transcript of a defense lawyer's conversation. The trial will now be resumed, since the decision in effect ends the stay issued in July by Justice William Douglas.

The Court rejects a petition for review filed by former *Los Angeles Times* reporter, William T. Farr, who faces jail for contempt for refusal to divulge the identity of a confidential source.

Nov. 20—The Court rules 6 to 0 that computer programming (i.e., "software") cannot be patented because it consists basically of ideas.

### VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)


(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Nov. 5—In Saigon, 10,000–15,000 Roman Catholics, who left North Vietnam after the French defeat in 1954, demonstrate against the peace settlement being negotiated in Paris.

Nov. 17—It is reported that President Nguyen Van Thieu is hurrying to complete organizing the new Democracy party, with some 100,000 members, so that he may be in a position of strength if a cease-fire agreement is reached.

### YUGOSLAVIA

Nov. 2—Koca Popovic resigns as one of 3 Serbian representatives on the collective Presidency of the Republic.



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